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A Case for Realizing Gains at Death
in Terms of Family Interests
Thomas L. Waterbury*
The Kennedy Administration's proposal of January 1963 that
gains be realized at death was less than robust at birth, and
short-lived. By May, Professor Anthoine doubted that ". . . the
country [was] yet ready for . . ."' it. Indeed, the terms of the

proposal suggested that its authors had earlier doubts on this
score.
To be sure, the central conception of the proposal, that net
unrealized appreciation in a decedent's capital assets, determined
as of the applicable estate tax valuation date, should be included in his final federal income tax return,2 could not be applied in that skeletal form. Hence the proposal dealt with net
losses,3 and realized net gains and losses in the event of an inter
vivos gift which the estate tax would not reach.4 And hence
the proposal should have provided, though it did not,5 for periodic realization of gains and losses on assets held in trust for
successive beneficiaries. The proposal also had to deal with a
number of narrower problems. For example, it was thought appropriate to distinguish assets subject to gains tax realization
at death from items of income in respect of a decedent, and to
tax such of the latter items that yield ordinary income as at
present.0 And, sensibly enough, ordinary personal belongings
and ordinary household goods of the decedent were exempted
from the realization at death proposal, both because of the unattractiveness of securing a detailed accounting of such items and
* Professor of Law, University of iinnesota.
1. Anthoine, Tax Reduction and Reform: A Lawyer's View, 63

COLum. L. REV. 809, 815 (1963).

2. Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means of the House
on the Tax Recommendations of the President, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 128 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
3. The proposal contained provision for some allowance of such
losses against ordinary income and a carryback of any excess of such
losses against the decedent's income of the three preceding years. Id.
4. Generally, the proposal would not have levied a gains tax in
the event of a transfer which would not remove the transferred property
from the donor's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. However,
it was proposed that a gift in contemplation of death be a taxable transfer. Id. item 8, at 139.
5. Professor Anthoine has called attention to this omission. Anthoine, supra note 1, at 816 n.23. For argument in support of a corrective,
see notes 185-87 infra and accompanying text.
6. Hearings, pt. 1, item 7, at 138.
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the likelihood that, if included, they would usually yield nondeductible personal losses.7
None of the foregoing, it will be observed, involves a material qualification of the principle that a gratuitous transfer of
an asset is a realization of gain for federal income tax purposes."
There were, however, such qualifications, culminating in the administration's claim that the applicability of the proposal would
be limited "to fewer than 3 percent of those who die each year."
Thus fifteen thousand dollars in gains were to be exempt in all
cases and a stepped-up basis was to be granted, as at present, to

the transferees of the assets involved. 10 Gain on the personal
residence of a decedent was also exempted, and a stepped-up
basis was granted as before, with the qualification that if the
decedent's spouse survived, the spouse must receive the residence in order to secure the exemption."_A "marital exclusion,"
corresponding to the federal estate tax marital deduction was
proposed, permitting nonrecognition of gain as to one-half of the
total appreciation in the decedent's estate if one-half of his total
property "goes" to his surviving spouse. 12 A similar exclusion
was proposed for inter vivos gifts to a spouse13 The proposal
would not have affected the present exclusion from income of
life insurance proceeds payable by reason of the death of the

7. Id. item 4(a) at 129.
8. The exception for items of ordinary income in respect of a decedent is not such a qualification. Realization at death for these items
would create a greater income bunching problem than realization at
death for items taxable at capital gains rates. Moreover, as to many of
the unrealized receivables of a cash basis taxpayer which fall into this
category, the period of delay until actual receipt by the decedent's
beneficiary is unlikely to be very long. Congress gave these reasons
for abandoning realization at death for such items in the Revenue Act
of 1942, which added § 126 (the predecessor of 1954 Code § 691) to the
1939 Code. See the House Report on § 125 of the House Bill (which
became § 126 of the 1942 Act) and the Senate Report on § 135 of the
Senate Bill (which became the same § 126 of the 1942 Act). H.R. REP.
No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 100 (1942). It must be admitted that this bunching argument
was stronger before enactment of INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1301-05 in
1964.
The failure to realize gains upon assets held in trust for successive
beneficiaries is technically distinguishable in that successive interests in
the same asset are created by one transfer in such a case.
9. Statement of Hon. C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury.
Hearings,pt. 1, at 55.
10. Hearings,pt. 1, item 4(d) at 132.
11. Id. item 4(e) at 132.
12. Id. item 4(c) at 130.
13. Id. item 8, at 139.
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insured. 14 Finally, gifts and bequests of appreciated assets to
charity were to remain exempt in their entirety. 15
However, even this restrained proposal was short-lived. By
the end of August 1963, the Ways and Means Committee had
decided to retain the forgiveness-at-death features of the present
gains tax,16 in lieu of struggling toward an acceptable draft of
its initially chosen alternative-a carry-over basis rule"7 of the
sort suggested by the Treasury Department during World War
II, per the late Randolph Paul,'8 and by Dean Griswold. 19
Since then a stillness has settled once more over this aspect
of the income tax-gratuitous transfer tax relationship. And
evidence of dissatisfaction with that stillness in
there is little
20
the country.
Perhaps, for a further time, the matter should rest there.
After all, since the enactment of the federal estate tax in 1916,
the federal government has levied progressive taxes upon the
transmission of wealth within the family as well as upon individual (and hence family) incomes. So the problem of achieving an appropriate relationship between those progressive taxes
14.
15.
16.
August
17.
part as

Id. item 7, at 139.
Id. item 4(b) at 130.
The Ways and Means Committee decision was reported in the
30, 1963, issue of a weekly tax publication, U.S. TAX WEXK.
Revenue Release 63-6 (May 28, 1963) provided in pertinent
follows:

With respect to the ... taxation of accrued gains on capital
assets at the time of gift or transfer at death, the Committee
tentatively approved ...

the "carryover basis rule." Under the

Committee decision, an asset transferred at death will have a
basis to the heir equal to the basis in the hands of the decedent
plus any estate tax attributable to the asset; this basis, however,
cannot exceed the fair market value of the asset at the time of
death.
18. Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means of the House
of Representatives on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 1, at 89 (unrev. ser. 1942).
19. Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of the Income, Estate,
and Gift Tax Provisions with Respect to Trusts and Other Transfers,

56 HARV.L. REv. 337, 350 (1942).

20. There is still some interest in the subject. See, e.g., Bittker,
A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARv.
L. REV. 925, 970 (1967); Somers, The Case for a Capital Gains Tax at
Death, 52 A.B.A.J. 346 (1966); Wormser, The Case Against a Capital

Gains Tax at Death, 51 A.B.A.J. 851 (1965).

And there were, of course,

contemporaneous comments upon the Kennedy Administration proposals. See, e.g., Anthoine, Tax Reduction and Reform: A Lawyer's View,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 815

(1963); Heckerling, The Death of the

"Stepped-Up" Basis at Death, 37 So. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1964); Koudelis,
Some Observations on the Proposed Capital Gains Reforms, 37 TEMP.

L.Q. 289 (1964).
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has been before the Congress and the Treasury for two generations. And, at least since 1918,21 a familiar feature of the administrative and congressional solution has been to refrain from
collecting the gains tax upon unrealized appreciation in a decedent's probate assets and to grant a new basis therefor to the
decedent's successors. 22 Moreover, the Congress has extended
this benefit to several classes of nonprobate assets, commonly 23
in the deceallowing a new basis only if the asset is included
24
purposes.
tax
estate
federal
for
estate
gross
dent's
There is nothing new, either, in academic scrutiny of gains
tax forgiveness. For instance, that fervent apostle of enterprise economics and progressive taxation, Henry Simons, regarded realization at death and the abolition of preferential
rates for capital gains as cornerstones of pre-25 and post-20
World War II federal tax reform.
Simons, who seems to have derived his notions of fairness
in taxation from the pro-producer premises of his beloved free
market system, favored peculiarly heavy taxation of gratuitous
receipts, commencing with the inclusion of such receipts in in21. Apparently the first explicit statutory provision for a new basis
at death was contained in Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(a) (3), 42 Stat. 229
(1921). The corresponding provision of the 1918 Act, Revenue Act of
1918, § 202(a), 40 Stat. 1060 (1918), did not make specific reference to
property received by bequest, devise, or descent but was interpreted to
provide a basis equal to fair market value on the date of death.
22. To be sure, not all probate assets reach a decedent's successors
tax free under the present law. For instance, many items of income in
respect of a decedent are probate assets, but are expressly denied a new
basis at death. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 691, 1014(c). See 3A J. MEaTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXAT:iON § 21.83.
23. One instance of property which is not includible in the decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes, but which is granted
a new basis is the surviving spouse's one-half share of community property in the case of decedents dying after 1947 when "at least one-half of
the whole of the community interest in such property was includible
in determining the value of the decedent's gross estate . . ." INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 1014(b) (6).
24. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1014-1 to -8
(1957). INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014(b) (9), which was added in 1954,
contains a broadly worded grant of the new basis at death in the case of:
property acquired from the decedent by reason of death, form
of ownership, or other conditions (including property acquired
through the exercise or non-exercise of a power of appointment), if by reason thereof the property is required to be
included in determining the value of the decedent's gross
estate ....

See also
25.

26.

SENATE REPORT, 1954 Code § 1014.
H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INcoME TAXATION 162-68 (1938).
H. SimoNs, FEDERAL INcoME TAX RFroRM 44-54 (1950).
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come.27 At the close of World War II, he became more concerned
with facilitating the accumulation of private capital and proposed
elimination of the income tax upon reinvested earnings coupled
with the imposition of a tax upon asset appreciation at death, or
upon the event of a gift. He believed that, in this way, a progressive tax might be collected agreeably with the needs of the
economy. 28
In a phrase, Simons sought to shift the progressive income tax
toward a progressive tax upon consumption expenditures and
gratuitous transactions. Gains tax realization at death, if not
before, was a central conception in his program. A number of
authorities share his dim view of forgiveness. 29 30 And a number
also share his enthusiasm for realization at death.
One might think that these academic objections would have
found sympathetic listeners among the legislative representa27. See H. SiMoNs, PERSONAL Ixcosm TAxATiox 125-47 (1938). The
following passage is illustrative.
The case for the taxation of gratuitous receipts as income stands,

as does the case for regarding the income tax as the basic form

of levy upon inheritance; but the case for supplementary levies
is also strong. The accumulation of property through receipt
of gifts, inheritances, and bequests is a kind of accumulation
which can be taxed with least adverse effect upon the morale
of an enterprise economy; and opinion generally supports especially heavy taxation of "income" in this form....
Id. at 144-45.
28. H. SimoNs, FEDERAL TAX REFORm 40, 44-54, 125-27 (1950).

29. E.g., Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1 at 89 (unrev. ser. 1942) (testimony of Randolph Paul then
adviser to the Treasury proposing the adoption of a statutory carryover
basis rule to the Congress); Heller, Investors' Decisions, Equity, and the
Capital Gains Tax, in JoINT COMAITEE ON THE EcoNozmc REPORT, 84TH
CONG., lST SEss., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR EcONOMIc GROWTH AND STABILmr 381, 393 (1955); COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TWENTIETH CENTURY FuND,
INC., FAcnG THE TAX PROBLEM 483 (1937); H. GROVES, POsTwAR TAXATION
AND EcONOmIc PROGRSS 60 (1946); L. SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX
TREATMENT OP CAPITAL GAINS AND LossEs 299-304 (1951); W. VICKREY,

The Paradox of
Capital Gains: Taxable Income That Ought Not to be Currently Taxed,
2 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 1243, 1250 (1959); Griswold, A Plan for
the Coordination of the Income, Estate and Gift Tax Provision with
Respect to Trusts and Other Transfers, 56 HAuv. L. REV. 337, 350 (1942)'
AGENDA FOR PROGRESsIVE TAXATION 139-42 (1947); Clark,

(also supporting the substitution of a carry-over basis rule); Holt &

Shelton, The Lock-in Effect of the Capital Gains Tax, 15

NAT'L TAX J.

337, 352 (1962); Tannenbaum, Basis of Property Transmitted at Death-

Need for Revision, 3 TAX L. REV. 166, 170 (1947).
30. E.g., R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEoRY Or PUBLIc FINANCE 167 (1959);
Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES
247, 257 (1957); see also the statements of Groves, Vickrey, Seltzer,
Heller, Clark, and Holt & Shelton, cited in the preceding note.
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tives of our many personal service income taxpayers. From a
distributional point of view, why should we forgive the readily
deferrable gains tax which is itself imposed at preferential rates?
Should we not, at least, limit the preference to the life span of
the taxpayer?
Yet the legislative response to all of this is well-known-a
substantial broadening of gains tax forgiveness at death under
the 1954 Code,31 and adherence to it in. 1963.
Doubts regarding congressional power to legislate in this
area do not seem substantial enough to explain the tenacity of
gains tax forgiveness at death. The substitution of a carryover basis rule appears to be within Congress' power to tax income under the sixteenth amendment. At least, the Supreme
Court's opinion in Taft v. Bowers,3 2 upholding the carry-over
gifts in the
basis rule which was made applicable to inter vivos
33
1921 Act, is fully consistent with that conclusion.
True, some doubt that the sixteenth amendment authorizes
an unapportioned income tax upon capital appreciation which is
34
otherwise unrealized, upon the event of a gratuitous transfer.
31. Congress decided, in 1954, that the new basis at death should
be made applicable to the generality oil cases in which property acquired from a decedent was required to be included in determining the
value of the decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. See
INT. REv. CODS of 1954, § 1014(b) (9), discussed in H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10708, 423-24 (1954). Of course, this extension did not encroach upon the
category of items of income in respect of a decedent, explicitly excepted
under INT.REv. CODE of 1954, § 1014(C).
32. 278 U.S. 470 (1929).
33. Mr. Justice McReynolds' opinion broadly affirms the power of
the Congress to prevent avoidance of the tax on realized gain by requiring a donee to accept the basis of his donor. Id. at 482-84.
34. Hearings pt. 4, at 2394, 2396-403 (1963) (American Bankers
Association); id. pt. 5, at 2836, 2839 (Committee of the Tax Section of
the New York State Bar Association). Boehner & Roehner, Realization:
Administrative Convenience or Constitutional Requirement?, 8 TAx L.
Rv. 178, 200 (1953).
The fullest discussion of the question is that of Roehmer and Roehner.
Interestingly, these authors distinguish the case of "a statute taxing to
the donor the appreciation in value of a gift," believing that a statute
taxing unrealized appreciation in a decedent's final return "unlike the
one taxing appreciation in gifts, is not necessary for the protection of
the revenue, since men do not die in order to reduce their income taxes."
Id.
It is not easy to believe that the Supreme Court would accept this
distinction in evaluating a general proposal to tax unrealized appreciation in the event of either a noncharitable gift or a noncharitable transfer at death.
The first reason is that, prima facie, the carry-over basis rule of
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But it is hard to see why these doubts should immobilize Congress.
First, assuming the doubts to be well founded, it would
seem that the distributional and economic effects of realization at

death or at the time of an inter vivos gift could be secured by a
constitutionally permissible excise tax upon the gratuitous transfer of property, levied at rates similar to gains tax rates, upon
that portion of the value of the transferred property equal to
its unrealized appreciation.3 5
REV. CODE Of 1954, § 1015 leaves less room for gains tax avoidance
by gift than does the forgiveness rule of § 1014 in the case of a transfer
at death. Hence, prima facie, the remedy of realization is less necessary in the former case than in the latter.
Secondly, the Roehners' notion that tax-motivated suicides are no
threat to the revenue may be conceded for, at best, it states an irrelevant truth. Surely it is more to the point that most taxpayers do expect
to die, and to leave their worldly goods behind when they do, and that
most of them have other beneficiaries whom they would choose to benefit in preference to the Treasury.
The Roehners' distinction is not implausible when applied to the
narrow category of cases which they had in primary focus. They were
focusing immediately upon the then current effort of the Treasury to
realize appreciation in the event of gifts of low basis inventory. Id. at
186-200. The tax incentives to such gifts are obviously greater. If the
gift of inventory is to charity, the donor will frequently have the reward
of a deduction against ordinary income. If the gift is to a private beneficiary, the income-splitting possibilities plainly may be much greater
than in the case of a gift of an appreciated capital asset.
35. This sort of suggestion has been made before. See L. SELTZER,
TnE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GANs AND LossEs 302-03
(1951).
A successful attack upon the constitutionality of this excise tax
approach certainly does not seem likely. The constitutionality of the
federal estate tax was upheld in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S.
345 (1921), and the federal gift tax was held constitutional in Bromely
v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929). Both taxes were sustained- as excise
taxes authorized by article I, § 8 of the Constitution, rather than direct taxes which, under article I, § 9, must be apportioned. While
article I, § 8, requires that excise taxes be uniform, this requirement is
only one of geographic uniformity. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S.
107, 158 (1911); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 85-87 (1900).
These points being clear, the remaining area of constitutional doubt
seems confined to the chance that the Supreme Court would hold an
excise tax thus limited to unrealized appreciation to be so unreasonable
and arbitrary in classification as to violate the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. This chance seems very small. In Watson v. State
Comptroller, 254 U.S. 122 (1920), the Court held that an additional
inheritance tax upon certain assets, upon which the decedent had not
paid property taxes during a fixed period prior to death, did not violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Conceding the overstatement of earlier cases stating that the fifth
amendment does not limit the taxing power of the Congress, e.g.,
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24-5 (1916), discussed in Dodd,
INT.

MINNESOTA LAW" REVIEW

[Vol. 52: 1

Second, the sixteenth amendment problem does not seem to
be very serious. Because Congress aas never attempted to tax
such appreciation as income, it seems inevitable that there would
be some doubt as to the constitutionality of such an unapportioned income tax. However, some analogous income taxes have
been imposed. For example, items of income in respect of a decedent were taxed in the decedent's final return from 1934-1942.36
More recently, the Treasury thought (mistakenly, it later concluded) that Congress had authorized the realization of gain to
a cash basis farmer upon a charitable or intrafamily gift of
wheat or livestock inventory. 37 And the income tax law has
long provided that gain shall be realized upon the gift of an installment obligation. 38 As a final example, in implementing
the recent revision of the stock option rules, Congress and the
Treasury have undertaken to tax, as personal service income,
gain upon a gift of stock acquired through the exercise of a
qualified stock option in order to police compliance with the holding period requirements of part II of subchapter D. 39
Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in ConstitutionalLaw, 29 YALE

L.J. 137 (1919); cf. United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S.
194, 200-01 (1960), it remains evident that the Supreme Court is more
reluctant to strike down a congressional classification under the fifth
amendment, which contains no "equal protection" clause, than to strike
down a state classification under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth, Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337-38 (1943);
H.

ROTTsC AEFER,

HANDBooK

OF

AmERicA

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw

215

(1939). Since the Supreme Court in Wat'on thought it quite reasonable
for a state legislature to single out assets which had not been subjected
to a property tax for a compensatory additional inheritance tax, it is
hard to believe that the Court would deny an analogous privilege to
Congress.
36. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 4:2, 48 Stat. 694; Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, § 42, 53 Stat. 24, prior to its amendment by Revenue Act of
1942, ch. 619, § 134(a), 56 Stat. 830.
37. I.T. 3910, 1948-1 Cum. BULL. 15, rev'd, Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1
Cum. BULL. 223; I.T. 3932, 1948-2 Cum. BuLL. 7, rev'd, Rev. Rul. 55-531,
1955-2 Cum. BULL. 520. See Griswold, Charitable Gifts of Income and
the Internal Revenue Code, 65 HAxv. L. REv. 84 (1951); Bittker, Charitable Gifts of Income and the Internal Revenue Code: Another View,

id. at 1375; Griswold, In Brief Reply, id. at 1389; Miller, Gifts of Income

and of Property: What the Horst Case Decides, 5 TAx L. REV. 1 (1949).
38. The current provision to this effect is INT. REV. CODE of 1954,

§ 453(d) (1).

The first such provision ap;?eared as § 44(d) of the Rev-

enue Act of 1928.
39. Under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 421(b), a disposition of stock,

acquired through the exercise of an option which qualifies under §§
421(b), 422(a), 423(a), or 424 (a) before the expiration of the requisite
holding periods causes the difference between the option price and the
value of the stock at the time of the exercise of the option to be taxed,
at the time of the disposition, as personal service income. Treas. Reg.
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Each of these situations can be distinguished from that of
appreciation in the value of such hardcore investments as land
and listed securities in terms of traditional statutory categories,
if not very clearly in terms of a constitutional requirement of
realization." Thus one of these situations involves, and another
sometimes involves, the taxation of personal service income previously earned, in respect of which the earning is the equivalent of realization.4 1 And two of these situations involve, and
another sometimes involves, the problem of determining a convenient point at which to tax previously realized gains from
property transactions. 42 Finally, all of these situations may be
distinguished from classic cases of investment appreciation on
the broad categorical basis that they pertain to income rather
than capital items.

43

§§ 1.421-6 (1959); 1.421-8(b) (1) (1966). One instance of such a disposition is a disposition by gift. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 425 (C).
40. Viewed as of constitutional significance, such distinctions suggest that this area of constitutional limitations on the taxing power
requires the Congress to turn unusually square corners. Thus neither
Miller, Griswold, nor Bittker, in their several articles cited in note 37
supra, was willing to discuss such distinctions in terms of constitutional
limitations upon congressional power.
41. This may be said of items of personal service income in respect
of a decedent, and of the compensatory element in the value of stock
acquired under a stock option as in note 39 supra. Helvering v. Enright,
312 U.S. 636 (1941), sustained the position of the Commissioner that §
42 of the Revenue Act of 1934 required an accrual at death of personal
service income attributable to a deceased law partner's right, under the

terms of the partnership agreement, to payments to his estate in respect
of his partnership percentage of "the earned proportion of the estimated
receipts from unfinished business."

Id. at 638.

In so doing, the Court

emphasized the relevance of the fact that the decedent had earned these
payments during his lifetime. Id. at 644.

42. Griswold thought, for instance, that the Treasury rulings on
gifts of wheat and livestock inventory, mentioned in note 37 supra
could be squared with the realization doctrine on the basis that the

wheat had been realized when severed and that the cattle also had been
realized (though he did not say when-at birth perhaps if they were
the yield of the taxpayer's breeding herd). Griswold, Charitable Gifts
of Income and the Internal Revenue Code, 65 HARV. L. R-v. 84, 86-88
(1951). And Magill though it easy enough to explain the realization of

gain upon the gift of an installment obligation on the basis that realization had occurred at the time of sale, so that deferral of tax was

discretionary with Congress. R. MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 416-17 (1945).
Finally, Griswold has tendered a similar rationalization of the rule of
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 691(a) (2), then Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 126

(a) (2) that the gratuitous transfer of a right to receive an item of income in respect of a decedent is a taxable event. Griswold, supra at 87.
43. Bittker and Griswold, in their articles cited in note 37 supra,
divided precisely at this point. Bittker thought it inappropriate, as a
matter of administrative policy, for the Treasury to heighten the con-
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So when the cases are examined to determine whether otherwise unrealized capital appreciation can be taxed when the capital is given away inter vivos or at death, reliance must be placed
on judicial language primarily addressed to some other question.
Eisner v. Macomber,44 dealing w.ith the taxability of a common on common stock dividend as a distribution of earnings and
profits, but stating flatly that unsevered asset appreciation is
not income within the amendment, is the piece de resistance of
those who think that realization at death poses a serious sixteenth amendment problem.45 Yet Eisner v. Macomber is qualified by Helvering v. Bruun,46 which held that value added to a
leasehold by the lessee's construction of a building thereon might
be taxed to the lessor when the latter regained possession upon
47
the lessee's default.
Helvering v. Horst, 48 can be read to say that the act of transferring soon-to-mature bond coupons by gift was a sufficient
realization of the bond interest because the act of transfer procured "a satisfaction" for the donor-.bondholder "which can be
obtained only by the expenditure of money or property."49 Thus
Horst has been cited as indicating the propriety, under the sixteenth amendment, of realization upon a transfer inter vivos or
at death.50
Helvering v. Stuart5l in turn qualified Horst by distinguishing it as a case in which the taxpayer had not "really disposed of
the res which produced the income." 52 The Court added (inaccurately, it would seem) 53 that "the 'non-material satisfactions'
trast between "income" and "capital" items by treating a gift of inventory as an event of realization while retaining the position that a gift
of an investment asset was not such an event. Bittker, supra note 37,
at 1377-78. Griswold was quite willing to accept this heightened contrast, but thought it better to achieve the result by statutory amendment than by administrative action. Griswold, supra note 42, at 90-93.
44. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
45. See, e.g., Roehner & Roebner, Realization: Administrative Convenience or ConstitutionalRequirement, 8 TAX L. REV.173, 174-75 (1953);
Hearings, pt. 4, at 2397-403 (Opinion of Special Tax Counsel for the
American Bankers Association).
46. 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
47. Id. at 468-69.
48. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
49. Id.at 117.
50. See the discussion of Horst in the opinion of the General Counsel of the Treasury regarding the constitutionality of the 1963 realization at death proposal, Hearings, pt. 1, at .594-98.
51. 317 U.S. 154 (1942).
52. Id. at 168.
53. As Rice observed, "The Horst case in fact held just the con-
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(gifts-contributions) of a donor are not taxable as income. '5 4
Hence, the Court held that a settlor who created irrevocable
trusts for the benefit of his adult children in 1930 was not taxable upon the trust income realized by the trustees in the years
1934 and 1935, though the trustees' dispositions of such income
"would satisfy the normal desire of a parent to make gifts to
his children."55 ,
The scope of the Stuart restriction of Horst is scarcely transparent. 56 Apparently some would read it broadly, as reducing
Horst to the proposition that an anticipatory assignment of the
immediately prospective yields produced and to be produced by a
57 Of
retained res may be disregarded for income tax purposes.
course, if the taxing premise of Horst is that the assignment of
the coupons was a nullity, the case furnishes no support for
the thesis that an assignment of an appreciated asset is an income
creating realization by the assignor of the appreciation.
This constricted reading, however, clearly conflicts with Mr.
Justice Stone's language in Horst, which, at the least, treats the
assignment of prospective yields by the donor, coupled with the
donee's later receipt of them, as a realization by the donor. He
repeated this formulation for a unanimous Court in Harrisonv.
Schaffner.5 8 Mr. Justice Reed, in Stuart, cited both cases with
approval in equating the donor's use of economic gain with
59
realizationthereof.
Accordingly, Stuart may simply be read as limiting Horst's
"realization by transfer and payment" premise to cases in which
the donor assigns the immediately prospective yield of a retained res and the yield is subsequently received by the assignee.
This reading may be rationalized as follows: In cases like
trary." Rice, Judicial Trends in GratuitousAssignments To Avoid Federal Income Taxes, 64 YALE L.J. 991, 995 (1955).
54. 317 U.S. at 168.
55. Id.
56. Rice, supra note 53, at 995.
57. Miller, Gifts of Income and of Property: What the Horst Case
Decides, 5 TAx L. REV. 1, 9 n.20, 10 (1950).
58. 312 U.S. 579, 580 (1941). In Schaffner, Mr. Justice Stone cited
Horst and Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940), in tandem for this
proposition. Eubank is a case in which the assignor retained no rights
whatever in the contracts assigned and yet, on the authority of Horst,
was held taxable on sums paid to the assignees. As Bittker has pointed
out, this use of Horst in Eubank makes such a restricted reading of
Horst difficult to maintain. Bittker, Charitable Gifts of Income and the
Internal Revenue Code: Another View, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1375, 1375-76
(1952).
59. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 168 (1942).
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Horst, the "use," i.e., "realization," of economic gain to the donor
is not one event but two. As to coupon interest accrued to the
date of the assignment, the act of realization was the act of
assignment to the donee. As to that accruing thereafter, prior
to the date of payment, the act of realization was payment to the
donee, pursuant to the donor's assigranent of the yield of a res
retained by the donor. As to both, the imposition of the tax
on the donor at any convenient time after realization was
proper. 60
And, of course, the implications of this latter reading for
gains tax realization upon a gratuitous transfer are very different from those of the former. By the former, the transfer itself is not a realization. By the latter, it is realization as to gain
accrued to the date of transfer. Since realized capital appreciation is as taxable a sort of income as any other, 61 the conclusion that accrued interest may be realized by the gratuitous transfer of an unmatured interest coupon supports the conclusion
that asset appreciation may also be realized upon such a transfer of an appreciated asset.
In view of our tradition against the treatment of gratuitous
transfers as taxable events, the Treasury's reluctance to advance this argument under section 61(a) and its predecessor is
not surprising.62 But, given explicit statutory language requiring realization upon a gratuitous transfer, the Supreme Court
would surely be faced with Horst. For the reasons given, it
seems that the Court would favor the latter reading of the case,
and find Horst a persuasive precedent for upholding the legislation.
Another reason for thinking thai the sixteenth amendment
problem is not a serious one is a cryptic footnote in Mr. Justice
Reed's opinion in Helvering v. Estate of Enright,3 which can be
read, in context, as assuming that gains tax realization at
death is constitutionally permissible.
60. "It may be that the act of payment would also suffice as a realization of the interest accrued to the date of transfer. Miller insisted
that Horst so held. Miller, supra note 57, at 7-10. But the Horst opinion emphasized both the act of assignment and the act of payment.
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116-18 (1940).

61. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921),
discussed in R. MAGmL, TAXABLE INcOmE 109-13 (rev. ed. 1945).
62.

The Treasury's effort, via I.T. 3910, see note 37 supra and ac-

companying text, to realize gain to a cash basis farmer upon a charitable gift of wheat or livestock inventory floundered in the courts on
just this point. Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954).
63. 312 U.S. 636, 645 n.23 (1941).
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Enright's Estate arose under section 42 of the 1934 Act which
provided that:
In the case of the death of a taxpayer there shall be included
in computing net income for the taxable period in which falls
the date of his death, amounts accrued up to the date of his
death if not otherwise properly includible in respect of such
period or a prior period.64
At his death, Enright was a cash basis partner in a cash basis
law firm. The partnership agreement entitled his estate to a
percentage of the firm's cash, receivables, and "the earned proportion of the estimated receipts from unfinished business" 65 at
his death. The Court held that the last item, like the first two,
was an amount "accrued" within section 42.
The Government argued that this construction of section 42
was necessary to achieve the congressional objective of preventing the loss of revenue resulting from decisions 6 holding that
such items were not taxable income to a decedent's estate when
67
received.
The taxpayer replied:
The same argument can be applied to increment in the value of
any property owned by a decedent at the time of his death.
Such increment could not be taxed as accrued income unless
the property had been sold prior to the date of death. The mere
desire to obtain revenue cannot justify the inclusion in the income of a decedent of any unrealized increment, under the Sixteenth Amendment. Likewise, the value of services which have
not ripened into income at the date 68of death cannot be classed as
income under the said Amendment.
The taxpayer also invoked the fifth amendment, arguing
that section 42, construed as the Government contended, discriminated against the deceased partner by bunching his income
in respect of firm work in process into one taxable year, while
the surviving partners were privileged to report their income as
received, and that such discrimination rendered section 42 "ar-69
bitrary, harsh, and confiscatory ....
Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for a unanimous Court, adopted
the Government's view on the first point.
Accruals here are to be construed in furtherance of the intent64. R~evenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 42, 48 Stat. 694. (Emphasis
added).
65. 312 U.S. at 638.
66. E.g., Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 241 (1927), cert. denied,
277 U.S. 584 (1928).
67. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 19-25, Helvering v. Estate of Enright,
312 U.S. 636 (1941).
68. Brief for Respondents, pp. 15-16, Helvering v. Estate of Enright,
312 U.S. 636 (1941).
69. Id. at 29.
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of Congress to cover into income the assets of decedents,
earned during their life and unreported as income, which on a
cash return, would appear in
the estate returns. Congress sought
a fair reflection of income. 7e
Then he added the following footnote.
It is immaterial that all possibility of escaping an income tax
is not barred, as for instance the increased value of asset items
is an estate return. Act, 113(a) (5) ....
"[T]he entire field of
proper legislation [need not] be covered by a single enactment."

Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260, 271 [1921] ...
; cf.
Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224, 227, . . . [1913].71

Both Rosenthal and Keokee are fourteenth amendment cases;
neither is a tax case. In each the appellant argued unsuccessfully that state legislation before the Court, which concededly
applied to him, denied him equal protection because it did not
impose like burdens upon others similarly situated. In Keokee,
Mr. Justice Holmes replied:
[A] statute aimed at what is deemed an evil, and hitting it
presumably where experience shows it to be most felt, is not to
be upset by thinking up and enumerating other instances to
which it might have been applied equally well, so far as the
court can see. That
72 is for the legislature to judge unless the
case is very clear.
It is easy to connect Mr. Justice Reed's footnote to his text
by supposing that he was addressing himself to the parallel
drawn by the taxpayer between a lawyer's work in process at
his death and an investor's asset appreciation at death. And it is
easy to connect the cases he cites to that parallel by supposing
that, in Mr. Justice Reed's view, section 42 could constitutionally
have been extended to cover asset appreciation insofar as the
sixteenth amendment is concerned.
Given these connections, the Court's footnote emerges as a
rather contemptuous revision of the taxpayer's constitutional
argument, and a response to the argument as revised. In other
words, the taxpayer might better argue that section 42 violates the fifth amendment because it does not extend to asset
appreciation, to which Congress could properly extend it under
the sixteenth amendment. But even this argument cannot prevail because it is within the prerogative of the Congress to close
some avenues to tax avoidance while permitting other like ave73
nues to remain open.
70.

312 U.S. 636, 644-45.

71. Id. at 645 n.23.
72. 234 U.S. 224, 227 (1913).
73. The characterization of gains tax forgiveness at death as an
avenue to tax avoidance is, of course, familiar. See the many authorities cited in note 29 supra. Many of the authorities therein cited pro-
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At least, I am inclined to accept this reading 74 and hence to
think that the Court addressed itself to and accepted the constitutionality of gains tax realization at death under the sixteenth amendment in Enright'sEstate.
Finally, it is hard to see why congressional respect for the
Supreme Court's position in Eisner v. Macomber should inhibit
the enactment of gains tax realization at death because a generation ago, in Helvering v. Griffiths, 75 the Court itself invited
the Congress to explicitly repudiate Macomber so as to give the
Court an opportunity to reconsider its holding. This being so,
why should the Congress hesitate to encroach again upon Ma76
comber's premise?
It would appear, therefore, that the future of gains tax forgiveness at death ought to be regarded as a legislative question
of politics and policy rather than as a question of constitutional
law. Thus, those who find Professor Anthoine's estimate of the
temper of "the country" too terse may call upon a rich legacy to
explain the doings of the Ways and Means Committee in this
instance. For the friends of forgiveness there is, of course, the
finest hour theory.77 Its foes, if spitefully inclined, may prefer
posed a carry-over basis rule as a remedy, but the remedy which was
before the Supreme Court in the Enright case was a realization at death
remedy.
74. In part, because a careful reading of the opinion and the briefs
of counsel in the Enright case fails to reveal a plausible alternative
explanation of Mr. Justice Reed's footnote.
75. 318 U.S. 371, 400-01 (1943).
76. For example, see the new provisions taxing certain income of
controlled foreign corporations to their United States shareholders. INT.
Rnv. CODE of 1954, §§ 951-64; For opinions presented to the Ways and
Means Committee as to whether these provisions are reconcilable with
Eisner v. Macomber, see Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and
Means, House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 1, at 311, 313.
77. This familiar theme is aptly illustrated by editorial views expressed in U.S. TAx WEEK, August 30, 1963, at 1337, in commenting upon
the demise of the Kennedy Administration's effort to eliminate gains tax
forgiveness at death:
Highlight
Ways & Means Comm. kills death basis reforms
Because of the difficulty encountered in drafting into legislative language its "final decisions" reached with respect to the
tax basis of property acquired from a decedent, the Ways &
Means Comm. has killed the proposed revisions to § 1014....
Comment
Good!
The existing § 1014 provides that the basis of property acquired
from a decedent shall be its fair market value at the date of the
decedent's death (or at an alternate valuation date). Thus, by
simply dying, a taxpayer can avoid income taxes on the unrealized appreciation in his properties.

The treasury .

.

. proposes
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the conspiracy theory,78 or if not, perhaps the more benevolent
meaning no harm theory.7 9 A cheekier alternative is the babesin-taxiandtheory,80 (as adapted, the Committee was deceived by
the progressive rate schedules into believing that our income tax
structure is more progressive than it is and hence was unduly
tolerant of forgiveness). Those addicted to the taxing insights
of the Supreme Court, and impressed with the Committee's drafting difficulties, may favor Mr. Justice Cardozo's eternal tally-ho
theorys ' (the Committee continues to pursue the wily gains taxto tax the unrealized appreciation in value as if the taxpayer
has sold the property at its fair market value upon his death
bed. . . . The Ways & Means Comin. wisely rejected this recommendation ....
We believe that most tax practitioners and IRS tax administrators who have to live with death-basis questions will join us
in hoping that the report of the death of the proposed changes
to § 1014 is not greatly exaggerated.
78. Progression has gone to seed rather ludicrously in our federal taxes. .

.

.

The result is a decorative sort of progression,

yielding much discussion, much indignation, and very little revenue ....

Moreover, the whole procedure involves

a subtle

kind of moral and political dishonesty. One senses here a grand
scheme of deception, whereby enormous surtaxes are voted in
exchange for promises that they will not be made effective.
Thus, politicians may point with pride to the rates, while quietly
reminding their wealthy constituents of the loopholes.
H. SIMoNs, PERSONAL INcoME TAXATION 218-19 (1938).
79. Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax
Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1145 (1957). Although advanced by Surrey to explain the success of lobbyists for bits of fine
print in the Code, the theory is plausibly applicable to Committee members preoccupied with the great economic issues of the recent revenue
revision.
In many cases the congressman considering a special tax provision may not realize that tax fairness is at all involved. He
sees only the problem of the particular constituent or group
concerned. The case in this focus may be very appealing ....
The proposal, so viewed, becomes merely a "little old amendment" which helps a constituent and does no harm.
Id. at 1156-57.
Cf. this stanza from a wishful and familiar boot camp ballad of World
War II:
So the pretty maiden, not meaning any harm,
Jumped in beside him to keep the sailor warm,
Singing,
'Bell bottomed trousers, coats of Navy blue,
He'll climb the rigging like his Daddy used to do.'
80. Thus, a decade ago, the late Randolph Paul presumed to explain to the Subcommittee on Tax Policy of the Joint Committee on the
Economic Report, that our tax system was not as progressive as appeared, upon a first glance at the rate schedules. Paul, Erosion of the
Tax Base and Rate Structure, JOINT CoMMvi. ON THE EcONOMIC REPORT,
PAPERS SUBMITTED BY PANELISTS APPEARING BEFORE THE SUBcOMM. ON
TAX PoLICY, 84TH CONG. IST SESS. 297 (1955).

81.

One can read in the revisions of the revenue acts the record

of the Government's endeavor to keep pace with the fertility of
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payer along the tricky trails of forgiveness, but, since 1918, has

failed to catch him).
With the constitutional law and political science of realization at death behind us, we face consideration of the matter as
one of legislative policy, and again, it is arguable that this aspect
has been sufficiently explored at the academic level, so that only
more time is needed to produce an enduring consensustime, that is, for the rationality of our less hidebound scholars
to accommodate to the unrationalized instincts of our populace
and their representatives, or vice versa. But of course I have not
thought so.
There has been, to my knowledge, no extended discussion of
gains tax realization at death, or of a carry-over basic rule, or

of gains tax forgiveness, in terms of the impact of any of these
alternatives upon the parties to transfers of property at death,
who are commonly members of the same family group. Yet,
for several reasons, such discussion seems relevant to a choice
among the three alternatives. First, there is the immediate impact of the question upon what may be termed the family interest 8 2 in the inheritance 3 of property. Second, there is sufinvention whereby taxpayers had contrived to keep the larger
benefits of ownership and be relieved of the attendant burdens.
Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 675-76 (1933).

82. There is sufficient domestic evidence that inheritance is predominantly a family matter. First, data indicates that "of those who
die with some accumulated wealth, only about half provide for its disposition by the leaving of a will." R.R. POWELL, CASES ON TRusTs AND
WILLs 11 (1960). This means, of course, that about half die intestate,
and, under our intestacy statutes, relatives take to the exclusion of nonrelatives, except in odd cases of escheat. More limited, though more
recent, data from probate records for Cook County, Illinois, indicates
that "almost 60 per cent of the estates are testate." Dunham, The
Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U.
CmI. L. Ruv. 241, 248 (1963). Professor Dunham's data also indicated a
90% concentration of wealth in the testate estates, Dunham, supra at
240-51. But Professor Powell was not so sure: "This percentage of
will-makers is lowest among persons of small wealth and becomes higher
(but never really high) as the quantity of wealth increases." R.R.
POWELL, supra at 11.

Second, it appears that most dispositions of wealth are in favor of
relatives, in particular spouses and descendants, in preference to charities or others. See Dunham, supra at 255-56.
Shoup's recent study, FEDERAL ESTATE A" GiFT TAXEs (1966), consisting of statistical evidence gathered from federal estate tax returns,
indicates that charitable transfers constituted a relatively small percentage of gross transfers at death. C. SHOup, supra table B-2, at 156.
See also id. table E-1, at 216. Data drawn from estate tax returns filed
in 1957 and 1959 for estates exceeding $1,000,000 shows norelatives as
life tenants of fewer than 14% of the noncharitable trusts created from
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ficiently widespread evidence of regard for family interests in
our tax and nontax law to suggest ;hat such interests may be
relevant to this legislative choice. Third, a consideration of this
family interest for the purpose of deciding how to tax gains unrealized at death may serve to illumin ate the much larger legislative problem of achieving an appropriate relationship between
our progressive federal taxes upon incomes and gratuitous transfers.
As will be seen, the immediate result of this inquiry into
family interests is a persuasive argument for the abolition of
gains tax forgiveness in favor of gains tax realization at death.
I.

FORGIVENESS AT DEATH AS A CONCESSION TO
INHERITANCE

The family interest in inheritance is the interest most im-

mediately served by forgiveness. Is forgiveness an appropriate
income tax subsidy to this family interest? It is convenient to
subdivide this question. First, can a persuasive case be made
for substantial concessions to the family interest in inheritance
under a progressive income tax structure?8 4 Second, if so, does
that case support this particular concession?
A. THE CASE: FOR Iwco m TAX SUBsIDIES

TO INHERITANCE

An evident route to such a case is to establish a parallel
between the families within our society and our society itself,
viz.:

that families are distinct and continuing social units with

significant ties to their past and future generations, so that each
family's interest in the inheritance of its property parallels that
of the society as a whole in benefiting from the material productivity of its past generations and contributing to that of its
future ones.
those estates. C. SHoUP, supra table B-8, at 165. While data regarding
the transfer of trust remainders is not available, it is clear that transfers
to relatives are preponderant. C. SHOUP, supra table B-9, at 166.
83. The term "inheritance" is hereinafter used to refer to intrafamily transfers of property for other purposes than immediate consumption by the transferee, whether the transfers are effected inter
vivos or at the death of the transferor.
84. There have, of course, been doubts about this. Simons certainly had some. See note 27 supra. And other scholars have, in recent
years, pondered the propriety of cumulative income tax burdens upon
the inheritance of property. See, e.g., W. BLm & H. KALvmx, THa
UNEASY CASE FOR PRoGREssxm TAxATIoa 87 n.214 (1953); Klein, An
Enigma in the Federal Income Tax: The Meaning of the Word "Gift",
48 MIn. L. REv. 215, 225-27, 246-59 (1963).
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Indeed, it is easy to concede that our families are distinctly
subordinate social units without impairing the position that they
possess sufficient continuity to justify substantial concession to
the family interest in inheritance under our progressive income
tax.
An evident objection to this position is that it grossly overemphasizes the extent of the family interest in the inheritance
of property in our society. More precisely, most American families are far more dependent upon the personal capacities of
their present and succeeding generations to produce income than
upon the inheritance of substantial amounts of property from
their past generations. 5 So, it may be argued, tax concessions
to the inheritance of property are an inappropriate subsidy to the
interests of a small, and privileged, minority of our families.
But this broad objection is vulnerable. The inheritance of
property is only an instance of inheritance. One is also indebted
to his family for heredity and environment, and the fact that
this part of one's inheritance is blended indistinguishably into
his personal capacities scarcely demonstrates that it is of less
importance to his future prospects than an inheritance of property which is not so blended.8
This personal inheritance is
85. This fact is indicated by recent studies of the nationwide distribution of income and wealth. Lampman concludes that "only about
25 per cent of all income may be characterized as property income."
R. LAmPwAN, THE SHARE oF Top WEALTH-HOLDERS IN NATIONAL WEALTH
7 (1962). This study also indicates that a minimum of 2.28% of households and 2.35% of married couples have at least one member owning
$60,000 of gross estate. Leaning on prior research by Kuznets, Lampman offers the following:
The association of high income and larger wealth-holding
is also indicated by the concentration of property income in the
higher income groups. The relatively great importance of property income for the top percentiles of persons when ranked
by per capita income is shown ...

[in] Kuznets' work ....

[WIhile "property income" (in this case, rent, interest, and
dividends) is 15.8 per cent of the income of the total population,
it is 48.7 per cent of the income of the top 1 per cent....
[TIhis top 1 per cent received 40 per cent of the national total
of property income.
Id. at 108.
86. But see W. BLmV & H. KALvEN, supra note 84, who take a more
individualistic view of personal achievement and urge that the tax law
should respect the interest of the individual in the rewards that he has
earned.
[We assume] that those around us and we ourselves deserve in
some way the praise and blame, the rewards and punishments,
we all dispense and receive ....

No matter what our endow-

ments of heredity and environment, something more is required
for them to be realized, and this something must be close to the
heart of personal responsibility. For fulfillment, even the most
lavish talents require perseverance, discipline, integrity, dedi-
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transmitted to him without exposure to the burdens of our gift8 7

and death taxes. So the fact that the inheritance of substantial
amounts of property is a distinctly minority phenomenon does
not establish that substantial benefit from the total inheritance
derived from one's family is a minority phenomenon. And it is
clear that the inheritance of property is already burdened with
some taxes which do not apply to an inheritance of personal
capacities.
A further objection to the position that income tax concessions to the inheritance of property are justified by the status of
the family as a continuing social unit is the direct retort that
the "majority" family unit in contemporary American society is
a contracting one, centering upon the husband-wife relationship
in each generation, rather than upon lineal ties. John Stuart
Mill raised this point a century ago,88 and the theme is a familiar
one among modern sociologists.8 9
To be sure, those who make this point seem clearer on the
withering of collateral ties within the majority family than in

the withering of lineal ones 0° Nonetheless, a part of this line of
thought is that the family unit is primarily a transitory union of
spouses rather than a unit with a continuity which is sustained
by strong lineal ties.91
.But, assuming that the family unit has so contracted, the
cation and other personal qualities. There are at least two
reasons, not just one, why most of us do not play the violin as
well as Hefetz. It may be that personal responsibility is just
one more inherited talent, but even so it is still uniquely appealing to tie our system of rewards and punishments to it.
W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, supra note 84, at 82-83. Why is it not even more
appealing (insofar as there is appeal, in facing facts) to acknowledge
that if we tie our system of rewards and punishments (insofar as that
is contained in the tax law) to either of Ihe reasons, we necessarily tie
it to both? ,
87. Apparently it has not been the practice of the Treasury to
attempt to collect gift taxes upon transfers made to dependents for maintenance, at least where the argument is available that the transfers
satisfied a legal obligation of support imposed upon the transferor under
local law. Note, Federal Tax Aspects of the Obligation to Support, 74
HARv. L. REv. 1191, 1213 (1961); see also ALI,FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT
TAX PR6aJ~T'98 (Study Draft No.* 1, 1965).
Of course, many transfers for the maintenance of the transferee
would avoid' the gift tax in any case. See INT. Rav. CoDE of 1954, §
2503 (b).
88. 1 J. MILL, PRINcIPLEs OF PoLITicAL EcoNormy 282-83 (5th London
ed. 1920).

89. E.g., J.SnJAMAKi

CENTURY 83-85 (1953).

90. Id.
91. Id. at 100.
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relevance of the fact to the present inquiry is not clear. Our
subject is the conflict between the desire of contemporary Americans to provide for their families, and the redistributional effect of a progressive tax structure, which tends to require them
to provide for strangers instead. The asserted contraction in the
family unit is only relevant to that conflict insofar as it indicates
that we are significantly more willing to disadvantage our lineals
in order to improve the lot of the generality of society than our
fathers and grandfathers were. It is not very clear that this is so.
At a glance, there is a great preoccupation with children and
grandchildren in contemporary American society. Certainly, as
a whole, we are providing more adequately for them than was
true in generations past. As a matter of longevity, it seems
more likely that we and our children will be personally acquainted with our more remote lineals than was true in colonial
times. And, insofar as family unity is thought to vary directly
with affluence, 92 have we not been called the affluent society?
Moreover, the tradition of mutual assistance within the family is surely the most prominent instance of redistribution of
income and wealth within society. Much of this assistance is
mutual, in the substantial sense that, with the benefit of hindsight, quid pro quos may be observed. Doubtless much of the
assistance afforded by children to lineal, and in some cases collateral, ancestors may appropriately be described in these terms.
Doubtless the same point is stronger still in the context of things
that spouses and siblings do for one another. And no doubt
there is self-realization, if not a calculation of future material
benefits, in the case of much assistance given to lineal and even
collateral descendants. Nonetheless, even this mutual assistance is redistributional in the sense that assistance is given and
received as an incident of the status of the parties in relation
to one another, as members of a common social unit, rather
than in performance of an arm's length bargain.
Such redistribution of wealth and income within the family
unit, it may be argued, is analogous to the redistributive functions sought to be achieved by a progressive income tax structure. The analogy proceeds upon the assumption that the social
and moral principles which motivate redistribution within the
family unit are similar to the policies underlying the attempt,
92. It is commonplace to contrast the relative stability (in descending order) of "upper," "upper-middle," and "lower-middle" class farnflies with the relative instability (in ascending order) of "Working"
and "lower" class families. See, e.g., J. SIiuAmrAi, supra note 89, at
138-51.
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through the progressive income tax, to redistribute wealth and
income among the larger unit of society. If this is so, is it feasible, under a democratic system, to assert that individuals should
assume the burdens of redistribution among the large unit
without recognizing the desire of the individual to perform a
similar function within his own family unit. Conversely, the
analogy can, in addition to justifying a tax concession to inheritance, serve as support for a redistributional progressive income tax structure. Recognition of the legitimacy of the motives which underlie redistribution within the family unit justifies, to some degree, the application of the same motives to the
benefit of the society as a whole.
It may be urged that the analogy of the society to the family for the latter purpose fails because the "voluntary" redistribution which occurs within effective family units is the antithesis of the "coerced" redistribution which is imposed upon
those who pay the progressive portion of the income tax. 3 But,
since a variety of nonlegal sanctions prompt provision for one's
family, this argument seriously overstates the element of unconditional free will involved in family redistribution. And since
the prime point of the analogy of the society to the family is to
persuade those who pay redistributional taxes of the reasonableness of the progressive principle, so as to minimize the need to
coerce them into compliance, the fact that they may have felt
unduly coerced in the past scarcely demonstrates the wisdom of
maximizing this complaint in the future. The fact that redistribution within the family unit enjoys such wide acceptance tends
rather to support the conclusion that redistribution throughout
society is more likely to be accepted if it can be reconciled with
family redistribution.
It may also be urged that the analogy of the society to
the family for this tax purpose fails because the premise that
an income tax should be seriously redistributional is in hopeless conflict with the premise that an income tax should make
substantial concessions to family interests, and in particular to
the family interest in the inheritance of property. But of course
this is not so.
It is quite true that the harmonizing of these premises leads
to a very different progressive income tax structure than that
envisioned by Simons and his disciples-one in which gratuitous
93. This problem of coercion evidently contributed to the uneasiness of Blum & Kalven, regarding progression in taxation. See W.
BLUm & H. KALVEN, supra note 84, at 455, 496.
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(and hence intrafamily) transfers were singled out for peculiarly
heavy redistributional taxation 4 But there is nothing apparent
in either of these premises that would foreclose substantial progression in the taxation of income devoted to the maintenance of
an unreasonably high standard of living, or in the taxation of
savings and other accumulations of wealth which were unreasonably large in relation to future family needs.
Indeed, the acknowledgment of the redistributional claims of
the family as a counterbalance to those of the society seems useful as a partial answer to the familiar objection that progression
in taxation, once conceded in principle, is uncontrollable in
practice because one degree of progressivity is as defensible as
another2Y At least the response is available that there is one
appropriate stopping point-that at which further redistribution
of income and wealth would unduly infringe upon the redistributional interests of the families whose income and wealth are
being redistributed.
It may also be urged that taxing concessions to the family
interest in redistribution will not promote acceptance of redistribution in taxation because family relationships are unique,
being founded as they are upon ties of blood, marriage, and personal association. Perhaps, but this is an ultimate prediction.
And some evidence to the contrary exists in the traditional efforts of organized religion to extend benevolent family instincts
beyond the family.90
The objection does suggest, though, that a progressive tax
structure which seeks sanction in the family interest in redistribution should also seek sanction in voluntary provision for
nonrelatives, because such a structure ultimately asserts a duty
to provide for nonrelatives in general. On this tack, differences
between the tax treatment of gratuitous transfers to relatives
97
and those to nonrelatives might well be kept to a minimum.
A more telling objection to a progressive tax structure which
concedes a substantial family interest in redistribution is that
such a structure cannot hope to achieve equality of opportunity
for the children of the society. Surely, this is quite true. Some
children are much wiser than others in their choice of lineage
94. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
95. See Blum & Kalven's perceptive discussion of this problem, W.
BLum & H. KALVEN, supra note 84, at 461-65.
96. See note 106 infra and accompanying text.
97. A rather striking instance of offense in this regard is afforded
by the rate classifications under state inheritance taxes. See, e.g., MfNN.
STAT. § 291.03 (1965).
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and are handsomely rewarded for that single act of wisdom,
while others pay most cruelly for th.ieir lack of foresight. But,
as Blum and Kalven have pointed out,98 equality of opportunity
is an attainable redistributional goal only if we are willing to
abandon our customary practice of bearing, rearing, and educating children within families. It is evident that we are not. And
it is not evident that we would improve the society in the future
by working toward a change in this customary practice. These
things being so, more modest redistributional goals are indicated.
Let us consider, then, whether our redistributional tax structure is likely to achieve more for children who do not have families to underwrite their opportunities in the customary way if
the structure is designed to wage militant war against the family interest in redistribution, or to accommodate to it by substantial taxing concessions.
Is not the promise of the first course materially impaired by
its invitation to those who pay progressive taxes to regard them
as weapons of assault upon their families-a view well calculated,
insofar as defense of family remains instinctive, to arouse savage
hostility and uninhibited countermeasures? And this first course
has other weaknesses which, if less irrational in origin, are no
less grave.
Any attempt to enlist ethical support for progression by
rationalizing such taxes as a legislative recognition of the brotherhood of men across the society may be met with the question,
how plausible is such a claim when it is founded on a denial
that the brotherhood of brothers itself has relevance for progressive tax purposes?
Further, any attempt to support progression more analytically as founded on bonds of mutual interest which extend across
the society must reckon with the retort that family members are
united by these same bonds, plus the more immediate ones of
family interest.
Finally there is evidence of the futility of such an assault
upon redistribution within the family in the fact that the best
progression scholarship, undertaken without explicit attention
to this family interest, tends to present a case for progression
in taxation which leans upon it. Blum and Kalven, whose
admirable treatise supports progression by downgrading the entitlement of anyone to reap where he has not sown while exalting
98. W.

BLum. & H. KALv,

supra note 84, at 504.
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the entitlement of superior producers, as individuals, to superior
rewards, may be read as resting substantially upon the ethical
entitlement of the society's children to redistribution. This
thought is most difficult to disassociate from the family interest
in children.
Thus, Blum and Kalven found it easier to justify the progressive taxation of inheritance than the progressive taxation of
income.
For our purposes it can be safely concluded that the case
for lessening inequalities in . .. inheritance is surely stronger
than the case for lessening inequalities of income. The windfall aspect of inheritance clearly distinguishes the two cases.
Moreover there is a tradition of favoring a progressive
tax on
inheritance but a proportionate tax on income. 99

On the other hand, they were troubled by the argument
that income is, to a significant degree, the product of an individual for which he alone is responsible, as distinct from the
product of heredity and the environment for which his family
and his society are responsible. 10 0 Blum and Kalven retain their
allegiance to these themes by supporting the progressive taxation
of income on the ground that it would minimize expenditures
by productive
parents for the benefit of their nonproductive
0
children.' '
Later, however, in discussing the affirmative case for progressive taxation as a means of promoting economic equality
within the society, something suspiciously like a primary, though
implicit, appeal to our family experiences and the familiar ethical
appeal to the brotherhood of men appears in their argument.
The thing that most clearly emerges is that the case for
mitigating economic inequalities is a different case when the
reference is to adults than when it is to children ....
There is
an enormously stronger ethical claim to equality for the sake
of children. What may reduce to envy as among adults surely
is justice as among children; the contribution to the general welfare which comes from equalizing opportunities among the children is also compelling; and the majority of the doubts about the
fairness of a competitive system of rewards would
be put to
rest if the start of the race were thus equalized.'0 2
At least as a matter of sequence, their primary argument at
this point is the "ethical" quality and "justice" of a societal
interest in the children of the society. Since these meticulous
scholars did not state the sources of this interest in children and
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 502-03.
See the passage quoted in note 87 supra.
W. BLum & H. KALvEN, supra note 84, at 503.
Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
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these notions of ethics and justice, their sources must have been
thought familiar. Are not our experiences within our own
families the most familiar sources of our general interest in children? And is not the theme of the brotherhood of men the
source of the "ethical" quality and "justice" of that interest?
Compare the posture of the matter if, instead, we reason
from the premise that the social interest in redistribution
through the progressive income tax should be expressed in a tax
structure deliberately designed to make substantial concessions
to the family interest in redistribution.
Is it not more difficult for a family buff to achieve heat in
denying the propriety of progressive taxation, or the degree of
it, if those who oppose him concede the competing interest in
redistribution within the family and only urge, by analogy, that
some, or more, redistribution across the society through taxation
is appropriate. Also, advocates of family redistributional interests have difficulty in constructing an appealing and plausible
case for it which will not bear extension beyond the family to
the society. Thus if one urges that the income tax should respect the family interest in inheritance because the family, like
society, is a continuing social unit, it is hard to top the response
which concedes the point, but adds that this family interest is,
after all, prominently redistributional, and that the society is
also a social unit.
The reply cannot be a denial
of the redistributional nature
10 3
of the inheritance of property.
The reply cannot be, either, the individualistic point that the
transmission of property by inheritance is a voluntary act in the
individualistic tradition, while redistribution under the tax law
is sheer collectivism. This point has been anticipated. 104 To argue that a gratuitous transfer within the family is an individualistic act of free will is to deny the force of the very ties which
were urged above as strong enough to merit recognition of the
family as a social unit for tax purposes.
Nor is there much promise in the reply that family ties are
unique, so that we should eschew progression out of reverence
for the unique desire of our producers to provide for their families.
First, unless one is prepared to establish the existence of a
direct relationship between the strength of these ties and family
103. See page 21 supra.
104. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
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affluence, some strong family units will benefit from progres10 5
sion in the tax structure.
Second, this argument is in the teeth of our ethical tradition, previously adverted to, and expressed with (utilitarian)
fervor by Macmurray:
What is it ... that enables the natural instincts of family affection to be extended farther and farther beyond the bounds
of the natural family until it comes to embrace and hold together in a unity of affection masses of individuals who have
never met one another face to face? . . . This is not a the-

oretical question merely. It is the practical problem that has
faced human society from the beginning and which faces it
today.
History itself provides the answer. This is precisely the
function of religion ....

If we look to the development of

religion in history, we find that the extension of this bond of
family affection to larger and larger groups of people through
the acceptance of a common faith has been one of the controlling factors in the development of society. We are driven to
the conclusion that the function of religion is to increase the
scope and the complexity of human cooperation by creating,
sustaining, and expressing the union of persons in a spiritual
family or a spiritual brotherhood.... We might express this
shortly by saying that the task of religion is the maintenance
and extension of human community.106
105. The sociologists, while noting relative instability in "working"
class families (described as including "half or more of Americans"),
certainly do not suggest a general disregard of family obligations. J.
SIEnJAMAI, supra note 89, at 147.

Income tax data suggests that the families in this large segment of
society are not much affected by rate progression under the federal
income tax (as distinct from the progression introduced by the presence
of the basic personal exemptions). Thus Treasury data drawn from
individual income tax returns filed in respect of 1963 income shows
that over half of the joint returns and returns by surviving spouses,
which did report taxable income, paid tax at the then minimum marginal rate of 20%. More specifically, this was true of 17.5 million of
a total of 32.4 million such returns. Another 10.3 million of these
returns paid at the 22% marginal rate. IRS, STATIsTIcs OF INcomE,
INDDUAL RETURNS FOR 1963, table 32.

And the same income tax data show that these American families
are heavily concentrated in adjusted gross income brackets under $8,000,
at which modest levels the payment of taxes impinges materially upon
expenditures which may be regarded as important to the maintenance
of an adequate standard of living, which is certainly a significant family
interest. See text accompanying notes 120-21 infra.
Nonetheless, it is evident that these families do pay progressive income taxes when account is taken of the progressivity introduced by
the basic personal exemptions. So it seems unlikely that many of them
are hostile to having those with significantly larger incomes contribute
more than proportionately more to the heavy cost of government via
rate progression applicable to such larger incomes.
106.

(1936).

J. MACMURRAY, THE STRUCTURE OF REmIGIous ExPEIRNCE 36-38
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Third, the assertion of this position is itself so much evidence
that, contrary to the teaching of the ethical tradition just referred to, family traditions of mutual assistance do not readily
lend themselves to extension beyond the family to the society as
a whole. And if so, there is less reason for advocates of progression in taxation to exercise restraint in warring against family
interests.
A final reason for urging that we should have a progressive
income tax which respects the family interest in redistribution
(and hence the family interest in the inheritance of property)
is that we have had both a progressive income tax and a society
filled with families for half a century without any widespread
assumption of incompatibility between the two. Moreover, it is
a progressive income tax law which contains a number of provisions that serve family redistributional interests. Perhaps, then,
it is somewhat late in the day to stage a war between society and
the family within the covers of the Internal Revenue Code.
Anyway, to the extent of the persuasiveness of the foregoing, we have a case for the general propositions that tax concessions to the family interest in family income and wealth may
support the legitimacy of the progressive principle and, by
way of reciprocity, that tax concessions to the progressive principle may support the legitimacy of this family interest. And,
in like degree, we have succeeded in harmonizing the notion of
income tax concessions to the institution of inheritance with that
of taxing income, and gratuitous transfers, progressively.
As noted at the outset, however, such general propositions
cannot make a case for the particularincome tax concession to
inheritance which results from gains tax forgiveness at death.
We now have to consider whether this concession, or the less indulgent alternative of a carry-over basic rule, is a sensible way
to subsidize the family interest in inheritance.
B.

GAINS TAX FORGIVENESS (OR A CARRY-OVER BASIS) AS SPECIFIC
INco E TAX SUBSIDIES TO INHERITANCE

Upon turning to this narrower topic, one quickly discovers
that the yield of the prior discussion is not support for retaining
gains tax forgiveness, or even for the substitution of a carry-over
basis rule, but a solid argument for gains tax realization at death.
1.

The Family Interest in Realizing Gains at Death

Our problem under this heading is to consider whether gains
tax forgiveness, or a carry-over basis rule, or gains tax realization
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at death, is the more appropriate general rule, in view of the
family interests involved.
Even if we confine ourselves strictly to the family interest
in inheritance, it is easy to justify a preference for a carry-over
basis rule, as against gains tax forgiveness. To do this, we need
only to compare cases of the inheritance of appreciated assets
with cases of the inheritance of assets worth their cost which
were purchased with the after-gains-tax proceeds of appreciated assets. It may be argued that the gains tax should differentiate between these groups of cases because in the latter
case the gains were realized voluntarily by an inter vivos transaction, a fact which tends to insure that the payment of the gains
tax was not judged a serious burden by the seller. However, this
reasoning is satisfied by the proposal that gains tax forgiveness
be abolished in favor of a carry-over basis rule, which continues
postponement of the gains tax pending voluntary realization.
A further comparison will underline the inappropriateness of gains tax forgiveness as a concession to inheritance and,
beyond this, cast doubt on the appropriateness of a carry-over
basis. On the one hand, assume a case involving the inheritance of appreciated assets purchased with savings out of personal
service incomes, and, on the other, assume a case involving the
inheritance of assets of like cost, which have not appreciated, but
also purchased with savings out of like-sized personal service
incomes. Plainly, the inheritances will be larger in the former
group of cases. As plainly, because of gains tax forgiveness,
their accumulation will have been subjected to income taxation
at lower effective rates.
One can, to be sure, use the past to justify the present and
assert that this sort of disparity is, inherent in "our system."107
But such an assertion invites the retort that if income tax concessions to the family interest in inheritance are supportable in
general because they serve to justify the progressive taxation of
income, they should not be tailored in particular to tax inheritances regressively instead.
Nor can the onus of regression be avoided by the assertion
that a tax upon saving for initial investment is not comparable
to a tax at death upon unrealized appreciation because, within
107. Griswold once insisted, in these terms, though not in defense of
gains tax forgiveness, that there was a significant difference between
gifts of "appreciated property" and "other sorts of gifts of income."
"[Tjhe mere having of unrealized appreciation is not income. I do not
say that it could not be income. I merely say that it is not income
under our system" Griswold, In Brief Reply, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1389 (1952).
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limits, a saver can respond to a tax upon his income by curtailing
his consumption rather than his saving, while a gains tax levied
at death is a specific burden upon the family interest in inheritance. The same reasoning may be employed to question the
burden that is imposed upon inheritance by realization at death.
Thereby the owner of appreciated assets could fund the payment
of the gains tax at death by increased cash savings at the expense of inter vivos consumption.
Moreover, if we focus upon the income tax deferral aspects
of this last comparison, it appears that realization at death can
do more to bring the income taxation. of these cases into line than
a carry-over basis rule.1 08 The retention of an asset while it appreciates is a form of accumulation of wealth that is indistinguishable, in terms of family interests in the inheritance of property,
from the acquisition of like assets after they have appreciated by
investing savings out of personal serce income. Therefore, if it
is appropriate to collect an income tax upon the savings prior to
the inheritance of the asset in the latter case, it is appropriate to
collect a gains tax upon the appreciated asset, prior to its inheritance, in the former case.
It is true that there are ways to provide an inheritance out
of personal service income that will be taxed to the beneficiary
rather than to the employee or self-employed individual. Death
benefits under qualified retirement plans are an instance, insofar
as they are attributable to employer contributions not taxed to
the employee during his lifetime. 10 9 But such death benefits are
108. An exception should be made, of course, in instances in which
it would appear more burdensome to require the more successful investors to pay gains taxes at death than for the less successful ones to pay
initial income taxes on their savings. Such instances would, however,
appear to be uncommon. 'One might be that of assets of conjectural
value. Another might be appreciated assets that are nonetheless unmarketable.
109. The initial deferral of income under qualified plans is facilitated by a current deduction to the employer for contributions to such
plans. However, this current deduction is restricted by the general
statutory requirement that contributions by the employer are only deductible to the extent that they, together with other deductions allowed
for compensation for the employee's services, do not exceed a reasonable
allowance for such services. See INT. REV. ConE of 1954, § 404(a); Treas.
Reg. § 1.404(a)-l(b) (1966). The recipient of benefits under a qualified plan is taxed in the year of distribution. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§§ 402(a), 403(a), (b).
Such plans are in rather general use. It has been estimated that
over 158,000 qualified plans were in operation at the close of 1966,
including a little over 26,000 qualified plans covering self-employed individuals. P-H PENSION & PROFIT SHARING SERv. ff 15,002 (1966). Havig-
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distinguishable upon several grounds. First, such plans are primarily retirement plans. Hence the principal consequence of deferring personal service income under such plans is more likely
to be to provide maintenance for the employee in retirement
(and for his surviving spouse, if any) than to provide an inheritance for others. 110 In contrast no such restrictions limit the
amount of unrealized gains which may be deferred under a carryover basis rule. Second, the income tax that is ultimately collected in respect of such deferred compensation is an ordinary
income tax,"' except in the case of lump-sum distributions under
some qualified plans,112 wherein the recipient of deferred comhurst cites Department of Health, Education and Welfare correspondence
of January and March, 1964, indicating that some 23,100,000 employees

were covered by qualified plans at the end of 1962. H.

HAVIGHURST,

EMPLOYEES 27 (1964).
110. As to plans covering self-employed individuals, the statute now
requires such plans to provide that, not later than at age 70 or the
date of retirement, whichever occurs last, there shall be full distribution or commencement of annuity payments to run for the actual or
expected life of the employee or the employee and his spouse. INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 401(a) (9). Qualified pension, profit-sharing and stock
bonus plans are subject to less explicit limitations in this regard, but
the Treasury interprets its regulations as imposing a general requirement that benefits under such qualified plans be distributed to the
employee, so that payments to others "should be merely incidental." See
Rev. Rul. 656, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 280; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401-1(b) (1) (i),
(ii), (iii) (1966). The revenue ruling just referred to also holds that
an otherwise qualified pension, profit-sharing or stock bonus plan will
be disqualified if the plan
contains a provision permitting a participant to irrevocably.
elect, prior to retirement, to have all or a part of his nonforfeitable interest in the plan, which would otherwise become
available to him during his lifetime, paid to his designated beneficiary after his death ....
Rev. Rul. 656, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 280, 281. While the propriety of this
ruling has been questioned, it appears to represent the current position
of the Treasury. See 4A J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INcoME TAxATIoN § 25.05,
at 25 (rev. ed. 1966).
111. It is true that employer contributions may be devoted, in part
to the purchase of insurance upon an employee's life, payable to the
employee's beneficiaries; but if so, the employee may be currently taxable on the cost of such life insurance protection. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-16
(1966).
112. Capital gains treatment is available in respect of lump-sum distributions by qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus trusts.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 402(a) (2). Such treatment is also available
in respect of lump-sum distributions under those qualified annuity plans
described in INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 403(a) (1), (2). However, such
treatment is not available in respect of annuity plans established by §
501(c) (3) organizations or public schools. See § 403 (b). Nor is such
capital gains treatment available in respect of plans covering selfemployed individuals; instead, averaging is provided for in the case of
lump-sum distributions from such plans. See § 72(n).
DEFERRED

COMVIPENSATION FOR
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pensation receives all distributions to which he is entitled under
the plan within a single taxable year. But this capital gains
exception is unlikely to lead to capital gains treatment for death
benefits which have remained unrealized for an extended period
following the death of a deceased employee. The reason is that
the capital gains exception is only available to a distributee if
the lump-sum distribution to him is received in the taxable year
of the distributee in which distributions to him commence under
the plan.113 Third, the control which the employee, or his beneficiary, has over such deferred compensation during the period
of deferral is much less than the control which an investor, or
his beneficiary, has over individually owned appreciated assets.
There are, to be sure, individual deferred compensation arrangements which might be designed to provide death rather
than retirement benefits.11 4 But the income tax ultimately payable under these plans is an ordinary income tax, for no capital
gains exception is available under these individual contracts.
And, again, the control which the employee, or his beneficiary,
113. As to qualified pension, profit-sharing and stock bonus plans,
these restrictions are imposed by INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 402(a) (2),
which provides in pertinent part that capital gains treatment is available
if the total distributions payable with respect to any employee
are paid to the distributes within 1 taxable year of the distributee on account of the employee's death or other separation
from the service, or on account of the death of the employee
after his separation from the service ....
The phrase "total distributions payable" is not all-inclusive. See
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 402(a) (3) (C); Treas. Reg. § 1.402 (a) -1 (a)
(6) (ii) (1966).
The corresponding restrictions as to qualified annuity plans are
imposed by INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 403(a) (2) (A) (iii), which provides
in pertinent part that capital gains treatment is available if
the total amounts payable by reason of an employee's death or
other separation from the service, or by reason of the death of
an employee after the employee's separation from the service,
are paid to the payee within one taxable year of the payee ....
The phrase "total amounts" is not all inclusive. See INT. Rav. CODE of
1954, § 403(a) (2) (B); Treas. Reg. § 1.403(a)-2(b) (1) (1966).
114. Presumably there is nothing to :prevent an employee from contracting for the payment of deferred compensation after his death under
an individually negotiated deferred compensation contract. From the
employer's standpoint, however, long-continued deferral of receipt by
the employee or his beneficiaries may mean equally long-continued
deferral of the employer's deduction for compensation. See H. HAVIaHuRsT, supra note 109, at 274-82 (1964).
Cf. Bank of Sheridan v. United
States, 13 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 343 (D.Mont. 1963), holding that an employer could deduct a contribution to a non-qualified profit-sharing
plan even though individual employees did not appear to have nonforfeitable rights to the contribution, since any forfeitures would accrue
to the benefit of the remaining participants in the plan.
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has over such deferred compensation during the period of deferral is much less than an investor's control over his individually owned assets. It is difficult to design a nonqualified deferred compensation contract which gives nonforfeitable rights to
deferred compensation to the employee, or to his beneficiaries
after his death, without requiring the employee and his beneficiaries to rely upon the credit of the employer." 5
However, the shortcomings of a carry-over basis rule, and of
gains tax forgiveness, become most -apparent when we turn to
an analysis in terms of relative tax burdens upon, family interests in current maintenance and in the inheritance of property.
Let us ask, simply, whether it makes sense in terms of family
redistributional interests to require current payment of the income tax upon modest personal service incomes while indefinitely
deferring or forgiving the tax in respect of appreciated assets
held until the owner's death?
There are solid arguments for the view that it does not make
sense to do this. They pivot on the premise that we ought not to
exempt an income sufficient to permit. the tax-free maintenance of a reasonably adequate family standard of living, as we
did in the earlier years of the income tax." 0 This premise is as
supportable as the view that families with income above the bare
subsistence level benefit materially from the-services provided
by government '7 and hence should make some contribution to
the cost of government." 8s
115. H. HAviGHUIJST, supra note 109, at 283-84, 287-89.
116. Until 1931, with a brief exception during the years 1917-20, the
exemptions for a married couple with two dependents ranged from
$4,000 to $3,300, and, during these same years, the consumer price index
(taking the 1947-49 average as 100) ranged from a low of 42.3 in 1913,
to a high of 85.7 in 1920, 76.4 in 1921, being the next highest year. WAYS
AND MEANS CoMm., 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1 TAX REVISION COliPENDnnUM
527 (Comm. Print 1959). More, recently, the -consumer price index for
selected cities (taking the 1957-59 average-as 100) hap-ranged from 48.8
in 1940 to 109.9 in 1965. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATITICAL
Some tie between the
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 357 (1966).
revealed by data for 1957-58 and
1947-49 and 1957-59 based indexes isthe first five months of 1959 which show an index of 120.2 to 123.8 on
the 1947-49 base. WAYS AND MEAzs CoMMnW., supra Currently, of course,
the exemptions for a married couple with two dependents are $2,400.
& H. KALv=, TEM UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
117.' Cf. W. BLU
TAXATION 39 (1953). "If . . . resort is had to some general assumption

about the distribution of the highly diffuse benefits of government, the
one is that all citizens benefit approximately alike." Id.
plausible
most
118.
As Madden
put this point, in recording the opposition of The
Chamber of Commerce of the United States to proposals to increase personal exemptions incident to the 1954 code revision:
The chamber is opposed to the proposal to increase the ex-
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Given this premise, one such line of argument runs as follows. The initial reliance of every family has been upon the personal productive capacities of its members, of past generations if
not of the current one. Adequate, as distinct from subsistence
level, maintenance for the family is important to realizing the
personal productive capacities of both adults who are producing
currently and children whose productive capacities are at various
earlier stages of development.
In view of the foregoing, it is a clear distortion, if not an
inversion, of the appropriate tax impact upon family redistributional interests to tax personal service income which is required
for adequate current maintenance of the family and hence, at
lower income levels, impinge upon an already inadequate family
standard of living, while retaining a prolonged postponement or
exemption of income from the tax in order to subsidize the
transfer of an owner's gains to succeeding generations.
A similar line of argument asserts a somewhat more precise connection between the family redistributional interests in
maintenance and the inheritance of -property. The personal accumulation of a material amount of wealth for transmission at
death requires productive capacities that are well above the
average." 9 Productive capacities of this substantial kind can be
materially assisted in development by early maintenance and
economic opportunity at levels well above subsistence. 120 Hence
an indefinite deferral or exemption of gains unrealized at death
from the income tax, accompanied by such a tax upon ordinary
maintenance level incomes operates simultaneously to permit
families which have accumulated wealth to retain it for their
succeeding generations, while inhibiting the chances for comparable future accumulations by families which have not as yet
done so.
emptions of individual taxpayers up t:o $1,000. Surely everyone
should do his share, whether large or small, to bear the Nation's
responsibilities through direct taxes and, further, it is inequitable, as well as impractical, to transfer the income-tax responsibility of one class to another.
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 8300, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 3, at 1944 (1954).
119. Lampman's recent study indicates that "a minimum of 2.28%
of households and 2.35% of married couples have at least one member
owning $60,000 of gross estate." R. LAMAuuN, supra note 85, at 7. Even
if all of this wealth were personally accumulated by its owners--an
assumption which is scarcely flattering to the role of the inheritance of
property in our society-it is evident that a small percentage of our
producers possesses such talent for accumulation.
120. See, e.g., W. BLum & H. KALVEN, supra note 117, at 87.
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These arguments for gains tax realization at death, which
involve a comparison of the family interest in adequate current
maintenance with that in the inheritance of property, require
refinement if they are not to appear as general arguments against
any deferral of the income tax on savings out of current compensation, including, for example, deferral afforded by qualified
retirement plans or nonqualified deferred compensation contracts.
One basis for such refinement is that the latter means of
deferral serve primarily to fund maintenance in retirement.
Thus these deferrals reduce the demands of a family's retired
generation upon the productivity of later generations, a contribution to the family's financial future which is logically antecedent
to the accumulation of wealth for transfer by inheritance. Another basis for refinement is that deferrals which fund maintenance in retirement typically permit an individual taxpayer to realize his income over his expectancy, as distinct from the usually
shorter period of his personal productivity. Hence, such deferrals are primarily an income-averaging rather than a redistributional device.
The yield of this general consideration of gains tax forgiveness at death as a concession to the family interest in redistribution is a clear case for its abandonment. The reason is that this
concession is anomalous in the light of our income taxes upon
gains realized in switching investments, upon personal service
income that is realized, saved, and invested, and upon personal
service income used for family maintenance. However, the argument to this point has been aided by two assumptions: first,
as is doubtless true in the average case, that one who dies holding appreciated investments does not die prematurely; second,
that gains taxes are as readily payable as other income taxes,
which is only true in the case of readily marketable appreciated
assets. Let us test this case by viewing it in a situation in which
neither of these assumptions is correct.
Suppose the case of H, deceased, whose estate consists predominantly of shares in a close corporation in which he has been
active in an executive capacity. Let us assume that H's shares
cost him $10,000 and have a fair market value at his death which
is highly speculative, but which ranges between $150,000 and
$250,000. Also assume that H dies at a relatively young age,
leaving the stock to his several surviving dependents. Is gains
tax realization at death appropriate in such a case or should an
exception be created for cases of this kind? Let us consider,
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first, whether the difficulty in liquidating the investment to
pay the gains tax justifies such an exception.
The more limited concession of extending the time for payment of gains taxes might be appropriate, in order to prevent
forced sale liquidation of such investments. Such a concession
can be found at present under the federal estate tax law, n2 and
was included in the Kennedy Administration's realization at
death proposal. 122 It is even arguab2e that, as to assets of such
highly speculative value, the taxpayer should be given the further option of paying gains and estate taxes at a valuation
23
date subsequent to the decedent's deathM
121. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 6161, 6166. The former section authorizes the Treasury to extend the time for payment of the estate tax
upon a finding that the payment, on the due date, of any part of the
estate tax "would result in undue hardship to the estate," the permissible period of extension being "a reasonable period not in excess of 10
years from the date prescribed ... for payment of the tax," i.e., the
due date of the estate tax return, which is fifteen months after the date
of death. The latter section authorizes an executor to elect to pay "part
or all of the tax imposed by section 2001 in two or more (but not exceeding 10) equal installments." The election is available only
if the value of an interest in a closely held business which is
included in determining the gross estate of a decedent . . . exceeds either (1) 35 percent of the value of the gross estate of
such decedent, or (2) 50 percent of the taxable estate of such
decedent.
The election is limited to the tax attributable to the closely held business interest. Interests in two or more closely held businesses may be
treated as one for purposes of satisfying the above percentage requirements, "with respect to each of which there is included in determining
the value of the decedent's gross estate more than 50 percent of the
total value of each such business . ..

."

122. It was proposed that "section 6161 should be liberalized so that
circumstances involving a forced sale of a family business to outsiders,
or a forced sale on a depressed market, are considered to be an undue
hardship." WAYS AND MUEANS COMM., 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PRnSIENT'S
1963 TAX MESSAGE 131 (Comm. Print 1963). It was also proposed that
§ 303, which permits redemptions of stock to pay death taxes, be broadened to permit such redemptions to pay gains taxes on gains realized
at death. Id.
123. The optional valuation date for federal estate tax purposes is
familiar. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2032. This provision was inserted in
the federal estate tax in 1935 in response to depression-sparked concern
over rapid decline in the value of assets immediately following a decedent's death. C. LowNDEs &R. KRAME, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXEs
§ 18.3 (2d ed. 1962).
Since gains tax rates have a ceiling of 25% as opposed to 77% for
the federal estate tax, the maximum burden of a sharp decline in values
would be significantly less under a system of gains tax realization at
death. On the other hand, in the case of hard-to-value assets such As
the hypothetical close corporation stock under discussion, there is something to be said for an optional valuation period. First, insofar as realization at death involves the analogy of a transfer at death to a sale, it
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Perhaps we should go further and forgive the gains tax altogether in order to facilitate retention of such investments.
But why so when we do not facilitate the initial acquisition of
investments by forgiveness -of the income taxes on savings, or
gains taxes on gains realized inter vivos?
. It may also be argued that the prematurity- of death factor
justfies forgiveness in such cases. In effect, -the suggestion- is
that, in cases of premature death, unrealized asset appreciation
should be regarded as the proceeds of life insurance which are
generally not subjected to an income tax. 2 4 But this suggestion is difficult to defend.
Those who earn personal service incomes, or realize their
gains inter vivos, are required to run the risk of subsequent
premature death without being forgiven income taxes on their
inter vivos gains. This stock appreciation was inter vivos gain
to our decedent H, however speculative its amount may be.
"Pure"'125 life insurance gains are not of that character-at least
until a premature death becomes .predictable, at which time an
insured prospective decedent is not, to put it mildly, in an optimum position to make inter vivos use of the appreciation in
the value of his insurance policies.
It would seem, theref6re, that even'in this 'appealing case,
gains tax forgiveness at death is an inappropriate concession to
the family interest in inheritance and should be abandoned.
2. The Specificity of the Case for Gains Tax Realization at Death

It 'remains, however, to place this position in perspective in
relation to some other notable concessions to the inheritance of
may be argued that an asset of highly speculative value would not be
voluntarily sold if the prospects seemed at all bright that its value would
be more readily ascertainable within a reasonable period of time. Secondly, in-the specific case of an interest in a business in which the

decedent was active at his death, an optional valuation period might

)help to clarify the effect of the decedent's death upon the future of the
enterprise. Third, there is some authority, under the income tax, for a
deferral of the determination of the gain or loss -upon a deferred payment sale where the value of the consideration promised by the purchaser is unascertainable. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S.. 404 (1931); Commissioner v. Carter, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948). However, the Treasury

regards such cases as "rare and extraordinary." Rev. Rul. 402, 1958-2
CtJM. BuLL. 15.

-

124. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101.
125. The portion of a life insurance premium which is paid for current insurance protection is frequently 'termed the "pure insurance"

portion of a premium. See, e.g., Vickrey, Insurance Under the Federal
Income Tax, 52 YALE L.J. 554, 560, 562 (1943).
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property under our progressive income, estate and gift tax structure; for assuming acceptance of the argument thus far, it is
well to consider whether the abolition of gains tax forgiveness
can readily be urged as an isolated adjustment within our system of progressive taxes upon inheritance. For this purpose,
three prominent concessions will be considered, in each case only
for the limited purpose of determining whether the case for
realization at death is substantially applicable or distinguishable.
(a) Realization at Death in the Case of a Decedent's Life Insurance Proceeds
One such concession is that we do not realize gain to a decedent who, at his death, controls a policy of insurance upon his
life payable to beneficiaries of his choosing. It may seem to
friends of family interests that our practice in this regard is so
instinctively correct that the inquiry is idle. But we have an
equally well-settled practice of taxing decedents upon their life
insurance under the estate tax, though the reach of the estate tax
in this regard was reduced by the Congress in 1954.126

And

since the premise of the estate tax is that the decedent made a
taxable transfer of the proceeds of the policy, is it so self-evident that he did not previously acquire them for income tax
purposes?
Let us, for this purpose, consider an appealing case for maximum income tax concessions for life insurance proceeds. Suppose an insured decedent dies early in his productive life, having
recently purchased a declining term insurance policy upon his life
in the face amount of $100,000, payable to his dependents, and
having paid a single annual premium of $400. The risk which
this decedent insured against was the loss to his dependents
of his future personal income by reason of his premature death.
In the preceding discussion, it was argued that gains tax
forgiveness was an inappropriate income tax concession to the
family interest in the inheritance of property because we do not
forgive the income tax upon personal service incomes which are
required for adequate family maintenance, or upon other income
that is realized in the course of accumulating wealth for transmission at death. Do these arguments apply to our decedent's
life insurance gain of $99,600?
126. Under Int. Rev. Code of 1936, ch. 2, § 811(g), 53 Stat. 122, an
insured decedent was taxable upon the proceeds of life insurance purchased with premiums, or other consideration, paid directly or indirectly
by the decedent as well as under the circumstances specified in INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 2042.
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It seems evident that whether they do or not depends primarily12 7 upon whether the difference that pure life insurance
gains are created by a premature death, whereas unrealized
asset appreciation is not, is a difference in facts which justifies a
difference in tax results. That factual difference aside, it is
easy to argue that such life insurance proceeds are merely a
substitute for future earnings which the decedent would have
made but for his premature death, which earnings would have
been taxable income. On this tack the decedent's interest in providing for the policy beneficiaries after his death cannot even
found a case for a modest exemption of life insurance proceeds
equal in amount to the present value of the aggregate of $600
personal exemptions lost by his death, for, had he lived, he would
have had to spend more than $600 per year of his income in
maintaining himself.
Let us, then, consider the relevance of the prematurity of
death factor. Several arguments may be advanced for income
tax concessions to such an insured decedent.
First, it may be urged that the personal productive capacities
8
of a relatively young person are unlikely to be fully insured,1
and hence that the proceeds of pure insurance on his life are
unlikely to exceed the provision which he could have made for
the policy beneficiaries, after taxes and costs of self-maintenance,
had he lived out his productive expectancy. Indeed, this argument may be extended. Arguably, as a matter of social insurance, the surviving contemporaries of such underinsured decedents should make the latters' contributions to the cost of government. At least this line of argument states a reasonable case
for taxing such a decedent's life insurance proceeds with greater
restraint than the personal income which he would have earned
127. The argument that the decedent did not realize the proceeds
because his death was the event which created the right to the proceeds
seems seriously embarrassed by our practice of regarding the decedent
as their transferor for estate tax purposes in the case under discussion.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2042. Moreover, the distinction between the
decedent's realization of items of income accrued at death in Helvering
v. Estate of Enright, see notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text, and
the decedent's realization of the proceeds of insurance upon his life in
the hypothetical under discussion requires heavy emphasis upon the
rather formal distinction that personal service income is realized when
earned, even though it is not then available to the earner.
128. Institute of Life Insurance statistics for 1965 show disposable
income per family in the United States as $7,600 and life insurance per
family as $14,700, a ratio which surely suggests inadequate insurance
against early loss of future personal service income. IxsTrrUTE OF Lum
INsuRANcE, LIFE INSURNCE FACT

BOOK 22 (1966).
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had he-lived, though -the-case-for- a total exemption is embarmay extend to a -large amount of
rassed by the -fact that itlife insurance -proceeds. even though very small -personal -service
incomes are subjected, somewhat, to the-income tax.
Second, in the-average'case, our tax rates on personal service income will: be-&pplied to earnings over a full life span.
Because family -obligations irequently survive a prematurely deceased producer, it may be argued that a producer who dies pre
maturely- should be taxed on his actual earnings as though they
had been earned over a normal expectancy. Because the present
income tax law does not recognize this, it may be argued that
such a producer has'been overtaxed on the income earned prior
to his -death. If this much is accepted, then it is appropriate,
once such a prodficer is dead, to undertax the insurance proceeds which he leaves in lieu of the yield of his future productivity. -The- weakness of this argument, of course, is that large
life insurance gains-may be realized upon the death of an insured
who was too young to have -produced much in the way of taxable income 'prior to his -death.' But, again, this argument explains- why life insurance proceeds might reasonably be taxed
with greater restraint than the personal income which the dece-

dentwould have earned'had he'lived.-

And both of the preceding lines of argument may gain some
support from-an analogy between the proceeds of pure life insurance 'arid the- traditionally exempt category of damages for
personal injury 29- which can also provide a fund for the maintenance of dependents.

-

-

Finally, We are' consggidriiig an -instance in which the decedent's life irisutrance proceeds will be .included in his gross estate
for federal :estate tax purposes. The crux of the case for including such proceeds in income is that they -stand in lieu of
personal income-wich 'the decedent -would -have earned had
hd lived. This "fact inviteis the Trther point that the bulk of
such ihcome, had it been. earned, would have been. expended
-intervivos and hence would have escaped the estate tax. Hence
the argument is available -that the overestate taxation of such
proceeds 6rdates' a cas' for' their under-income taxation. If
there -were no more to the_ argument than this, it would be
wholly vidnerable to the proposal that both the income tax exemption andthe gross-estate inclffsion be eliminated. But there
129. See Hawkins -v Commissioner, 63B.T.A. 1023 -(1927) (holding
damages, for-libel and slander nontaxable); INT. -REv. CoDE of 1954, §
104(a) (2).
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is-more to it.
One of the embarrassments of the thesis that pur iifd ih
surance proceeds ought to be included in -the decedent's ffiial
return because they stand in lieu of his future-eafnihs -is th t
foreward averaging of income is required to fix the appropriate
"
rate of tax. This means that no kate can be realiSti~alli d:fehded as taxing the decedent as he would have been taxed, under future rates and exemptions,, with allowance for-future deductions, had he earned over his productive expectancy. This
being -so, crude expedients must be resorted to. If a tax -like
the estate tax, which has a large initial exemption, errs -in-unj.
dertaxation of life insurance proceeds, it errs most heavily in
this- direction in the case of smaller estates, and, -at- present
rates, may well err in the opposite direction in the case of large
ones.iio At least, this crude expedient is grossly consistent with
simultaneous respect for the family interest in inheritance and
progression in taxation.
To sum up, notwithstanding the existence of a solid dase for
collecting a gains tax upon gains transferred at-'death, a series
;f, at least collectively, substantial arguments can be-made-for
income tax concessions to the family interest-in mheritance--in
taxing pure insurance gains in cases of- premature -death;- wh&the decedent has insured his dependents against the luss,-thro'ugh
death, of his personal capacities to -produce -taxable mcome--ir
the future.
These arguments do not make a comprehensive case for 'exempting a decedent from an income tax upon his life insurance
proceeds. For example, if pure insurance proceeds are made payable to a decedent's estate to pay consumer debts incurred during his lifetime, the arguments just made are not fully applicable.
In such a case, the decedent receives a personal benefit-the
payment of a personal debt. - And, since there- is -an -estate--tax
deduction for clanms,iui insurance proceeds so used are not bur1
dened with a federal estate tax.. Further, if the insurance..prq,.
ceeds payable to a decedent's beneficiaries are the-proceeds ,of
permanent insurance so that the policy beneficiaries receive, in
part, a policy reserve including accrued but untaxed interest,
the arguments just made are not fully applicable either3 2 First,

130. See ALI FED. EsTATE

AND GIFT TAX PROJECT § X2 (Study Draft

No. 2, 1966), outlining proposals for rate reductions incident to the- revision of the federal estate and gift taxes into a "Unified Transfer Tax."
131. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2053 (a) (3).
132. It can, of course, be argued; in derogation of the -customary
rules of cash receipts accounting for federal income tax purposes, that
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the policy reserve was largely available to the decedent for inter vivos purposes. Second, it is less easy to characterize such
reserves as insurance against the loss of the decedent's personal
capacities to produce future income without extending the characterization to such investments as bonds with accrued interest, 33 or appreciated assets generally, and moving into a wholly
distinct area of argument-the advocacy of general income tax
1 34
forgiveness in cases of premature death.
Nonetheless, enough has been said to indicate that the case
previously made against gains tax forgiveness is not necessarily
applicable to the taxation of life insurance gains.
(b)

The Exclusion of Gifts and Inheritances from Income

It is apparent that the case made above for gains tax realization at death does not support the inclusion of gratuitous receipts in income, notwithstanding the fact that some friends of
135
realization at death also favor such inclusion.
First, the case made above for gains tax realization at death
rested materially upon the fact that an income tax is imposed
upon ordinary maintenance incomes. The friends of an income
tax upon gratuitous transfers do not seem to contemplate the
collection of such a tax upon the recipients of ordinary intrahousehold transfers for maintenance. 3 Hence, this part of the
argument for realization at death does not support the inclusion
of gratuitous receipts in income.
Second, the case made above for gains tax realization at
death is a case against the exemption of gain from the first
income tax upon it. A case for including gratuitous receipts in
the income of the recipient must be a case for imposing a second
income tax upon such receipts in any case in which such receipts
the interest element in these policy reserves should be taxed to the
policyholder as they accrue. W. VIcXREY, .&GENDA FOR PROGREsSIV TAXATION 65 (1947); Goode, Policyholders' Interest Income Prom Life Insurance Under the Income Tax, 16 VND. L. REv. 33 (1962).
133. Such interest accruals are currently taxed as items of income
in respect of a decedent. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 691(a); Treas. Reg.
1.691(a)-1(b) (1) (1957).
134. See text accompanying notes 124-25 supra.
135. E.g., R. MUSGRAVE, THm THEORY oF PuBntc FiNANcE 165-67 (1959).
136. Even Simons shrank from such rigorous application of the
principle, though he avoided a concession on the merits by pleading
that "the appropriate measures are forbidding from the standpoint of
administration; and we may be reconciled to the ignoring of giftt in
many such cases ...
"
H. SIMoNs, PEnsoNAL INCOum TAxATioN 136
(1938).
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were previously exposed to an initial income tax in the hands
of the transferor.'3 7 Indeed, the adoption of gains tax realization at death would serve to buttress this argument. The argument is inapplicable to the taxation of the recipient of life insurance proceeds which have not previously been taxed as income. But, in this instance, the substitution of an estate tax
thereon may be a defensible alternative. 13 8
Third, and more fundamentally, the proposal that gratuitous
receipts be included in income requires consideration of the question whether income tax rates and exemptions, primarily designed for application to earned receipts, should be applied to the
taxation of largely intrafamily gratuitous transactions. This
question was not reached in the consideration of the propriety of
gains tax realization at death. There is, moreover, a powerful
argument for a negative answer to the question-one which
should be persuasive both to persons who are inclined to think
that a gratuitous transferee has reaped where he has not sown
and hence should be taxed heavily upon his windfalls, 13 9 and to
those who are inclined to think of gratuitous transfers as a vital
mechanism for allocating a family's resources among its members, and hence deserving of peculiar subsidy under the tax structure. The point is that there are enough differences between
the receipt of a gratuitous transfer and the realization of individually produced income to place the burden of proof upon
those who would urge that the same set of tax rates and exemptions should apply indiscriminately to both.
Fourth, there is the more technical difficulty that, in many
cases of substantial gratuitous transfers, the beneficial interests
of the transferees cannot be identified and valued at the time of
the transfer for the purpose of subjecting them to an individualized income tax at progressive rates. Beneficial interests may be
given to unascertained persons, or may be subject to the exercise of discretionary powers held by trustees or other beneficiaries. In such cases, if the tax is to be collected when the transfer
is made, the rate of tax must be determined in ignorance of the
137. This point assumes, to be sure, that the inclusion of gratuitous
receipts in the incomes of donees would not be accompanied by allowing
a deduction to donors for gifts. But the premise that gratuitous transfers within the family are redistributional surely supports the conclusion
that the making of such a transfer is a personal expense of the donor.
And the generality of personal expenses are not deductible.
138. See discussion pp. 62-64 supra.
139. Blum & Kalven seems to have been so inclined. See note 99
supra and accompanying text.
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identity of the recipients. 140 And if a nonmdividualized gratuitous transfer tax must be resorted to m the case of these transfers-it seems arguable that such a tax should be employed in
all cases in the interest of uniformity And, if so, why struggle
tofit the resulting tax into the category of an income tax rather

tlan that of a gratuitous transfer tax?
.(c) The Failure To Collect Gift or Estate.Taxes in Each Generation
Tle problem here is, of course, that successive outright transfers of wealth from generation to generation result in gift or
estate tax exposure upon the occasion of each successive transfer, Vhereas a single transfer creatinig successive interests in
severa generations, results, if made with ordinary attention to
fix cdnsequences, in only one such exposure.
At a glance, this problem seems no more related to the
case made above for gains tax realization at death than the quesfion vhether gratuitous receipts should be included in income.
Again, insofar as the case for realization at death rests upon
the income tax auinposed upon maintenance incomes, gratuitous
transfer. [axes are not ordinarily imposed upon such incomes.
Further,- both the -question whether gratuitous receipts
should .he.included n income, and the question of the .propriety
of.collecting a gratuitous transfer tax in each generation, relate
to taxes that burden successions to family wealth. Hence both
involve judgments regarding the continuity of family clanns to
family property. One may agree, with Rignano, that there is
no legitimate continuity in this regard beyond a couple of generations, so that the tax structure should be designed to exhaust
fiCmily wealth after it has been transmitted for a couple of generations:141 "Or one may think of families as subordinats, snrnl
140. There is recourse to an amusing variety of'statutory presumption as tco future events for the purpose of imposing the inheritance tax
currently Under MINN. STAT. § 291.11(5) (1965), in the case of-a transfer which leaves the identity of the recipient uncertain, a current tax is
imposed-at the highest rate which could ultimately be payable, with
provision for a refund. Ohio law is similar, Omo REV. CODE ANN. §
5731.28 -(1954)
Under Missouri law, a current tax is imposed at the
lowest :rati which could -ultimately be payable, 'with provision for a
deficiency. -Mo. REv. STAT. § 145.240(2) (1959). Under Illinois law, a
current imx is imposed-at the tate-which would ultimately be payable
if the most .probable events occurred, with provision for refund. ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 398 (1965)
141. "E7RIdNANo,,THE SocwL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INHaTANCE TAX
34 (W. J. Shultz transl. 1924)
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units within the society and insist that it is odd to contend that
a third generation heir to a nineteenth century fortune has no
legitimate claim to it, while assuming that each newborn citizen
of the United States has, as of birthright, his aliquot claim. to
our accumulated national wealth. The point of present importance is that neither of these positions questions the propriety
of continuing to levy progressive taxes upon gratuitous transfers,
and hence both of them accept the propriety of whittling down
accumulations of wealth as they are transmitted from generation
to generation. This point is important because the justification
of gains tax realization at death requires no such assumkption,
but depends solely on the assertion that the initial acquirer o.f
family wealth should pay an income tax on it.
Indeed, these distinctions are plain enough so that no one
would be likely to contest their conclusiveness if our progressive
taxes upon income and gratuitous transfers had. been .in operation, under rate schedules comparable to those .which. have prevailed since World War H, long enough to virtually insure .that
family wealth accumulated by past generations and transferred
to present ones had in fact been burdened more heavily by -these
progressive taxes than such wealth which is currently being
accumulated. The difficulty is that such is not the case,
To briefly review some familiar history, progressive taxation
in this century began with the enactment of a progressive income tax which, by its basis rules and exemption of gratuitous
receipts, treated past accumulations as sacrosanct. Several years
later, an estate tax was added which permitted an accumulation
of wealth, once exposed to the tax, to escape further death
taxes for the period of perpetuities if the transferor chose to take
full advantage of his chance to make a multigeneration transfer
in trust. Gains tax forgiveness at death accompanied the estath
tax, allowing the transferor to defer further gains taxes on appreciation in the transferred property for the full term of -the
trust and, indeed, beyond it if no realization was required in the
course of terminal distributions of principal.
A gift tax was not permanently added for another decade
and a half, during which interval, a well-advised inter vivo's
transferor could achieve a11 of the multigeneration: trust blessings above-mentioned, except gains tax forgiveness at death,
without sustaining the initial burden of paying the 'estate tax.
Hence one who observes thatcurrently it is necessary that
a decedent's wealth be exposed to estate tax rates which escalate
to a very high level in order to gain the advantage of" gains
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.tax forgiveness may wonder whether it makes much sense to
adopt gains tax realization at death without doing something to
insure that past multigeneration transfers will be burdened by
our income and gratuitous transfer taxes in some substantial
way. After all, to adopt gains tax realization at death without
doing so would be to insist upon exposing current accumulations for the benefit of immediate beneficiaries (other than a
spouse) to both an income and a gratuitous transfer tax, while
the more remote kindred of past transferors retain the blessings
aforesaid, perhaps still unburdened by exposure to either.
Indeed, in terms of the case made above for gains tax realization at death, it may be asked whether it makes sense to use the
current income taxes levied upon maintenance incomes, savings
out of personal service income, and realized gains, to justify
.realization of gain upon a gratuitous transfer, while ignoring
these possibilities of more remote tax-free inheritances of property. It is easy to concede, by way of initial response, that some
scheme should be devised for realizing gains periodically in the
case of assets held in multigeneration trusts-including those established in the past.142 The consequence of doing this, after
all, is only to collect a first tax upon such gains.
It is less evident, however, that the adoption of some scheme
for the collection of a new round of gratuitous transfer taxes
in each generation is also appropriate. Presumably, if such a
remedy were applied to tax each succession to the enjoyment of
past, as well as future, multigeneration transfers, the result
would be to collect some initial gratuitous transfer taxes upon
the hitherto untaxed principal of some old family trusts a
half century sooner than would otherwise be the case. But it is
as clear that the result would also be to collect further gratui.tous transfer taxes upon the property of other decedents whose
transfers have been made with assets already exposed to income
and estate or gift taxes. As demonstrated above, the case made
herein for gains tax realization at death does not support this
latter result.
This is not to say, of course, that such support may not be
found upon a further analysis of the family interest in inheritance. It is only to say that such support ought not to be assumed, Is it plain, for instance, that we should design a gratuitous transfer tax structure under which a grandparent's efforts
to transmit wealth to his grandchi.dren are burdened more
142. See Anthoine, Tax Reduction and Reform: A Lawyer's View,
63 CoLum. L. REv. 809, 816 (1963).
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heavily than like efforts to transmit like wealth to children? 143
So much for the specificity of the case for gains tax realization at death in terms of family interests. It seems appropriate,
before concluding the discussion, to relate this case to other factors which must be considered by the Congress in making a wise
legislative choice. The most emphasized of these, at the time
that the Kennedy Administration's realization at death proposal
was before the Congress, was the economic consequences of the
change.
II. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE CHOICE BETWEEN
GAINS TAX FORGIVENESS AND REALIZATION AT DEATH
Since the discussion under topic I considered gains tax forgiveness in terms of its impact upon the family interest in inheritance, while this one will consider it in terms of the impact of forgiveness upon the economy, it seems appropriate to
notice the relationship between the topics. The families within
society have a stake in the health of the national economy. Conversely, the national economy has a stake in the success with
which these families perform their subordinate roles within the
society. So, given a conflict between family and national economic interests, some attempt would have to be made to resolve
the conflict with minimum jeopardy to both. Our immediate
question under this topic is, however, a prior one. It is whether
significant national economic interests do hinge upon the choice
between gains tax forgiveness and realization at death.

143. This is the result of full fidelity to the premise that a single

transfer of property by a grandparent which creates successive estates
in his child and grandchild should be taxed as though there had been
two successive transfers of that property in fee, the second being from
the child to the grandchild.
In terms of family interests, this taxing premise seems to involve
the notion that there is a lesser grandparental interest in providing for
grandchildren than in providing for children, and, beyond this, that the
difference can be quantified in a meaningful way for tax purposes. Does
it follow, then, that, all else being equal, a grandparent who is bequeathing his wealth to his grandchildren because his children have predeceased him should pay higher death taxes than a like grandparent who

is bequeathing his wealth to his children?

For some current efforts of the American Law Institute to minimize
the use of successive estates as a device for gratuitous transfer tax
avoidance, see ALI FED. ESTATE AND Gnir TAx PROJECT § X40, App. II
(Study Draft No. 1, 1965); ALI FED. ESTATE AND Girr TAX PROJECT §§
EX 40-43, GX 40-43 (Study Draft No. 2, 1966).
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'A. TmE LocK-IN.ARGUMENT
Stated generally, the argument is that the prospect of de-

ferriiig and ultimately avoiding the gains tax by holding an ap"preciated asset until death, distorts the allocation of resources beecduse Inivestments which would otherwise be disposed of inter
-vivos in favor of others are retained to secure gains tax for44
"giveness.1
A key thought within this general point is that, if

-gams-were realized at death, the incentive to defer the gains tax
by retaining an appreciated asset would decline, rather than
4
increase, as the prospect of early death became greater. 5
But the argument is not very persuasive in this general form.
•
Ioinly- states 'an objection to gains tax forgiveness which can
be raised against any taxing provision, that makes significant tax
consequences turn upon an event within the control of the taxpayer.- Hence one is quickly led to the further question, how
important is this particular departure from economic neutrality
under the income tax? Or, more specifically, how significant is
the-influence of gains tax forgiveness upon the aggregate of investment decisions within our economy 9
- While it has been estimated that as large a proportion of
capital gains are forgiven at death as are realized by taxable
sales, or exchanges, 146 there seems to be little empirical evidence of the contribution of gains tax forgiveness at death to
this state of affairs. 47 And the analysis which demonstrates
that a rational investor would be increasingly reluctant to realize Ins gains as the prospect of his death became more immediate 4s cannot but remind us that a person who expects to die
within a few years may well have better reasons than gains tax
forgiveness for being inattentive to alternative investments.
True, such a person's investments may be in the hands of
agents who would give full rational weight to this factor. Still,
ie'-is difficult to suppress the thought that if we are really in
economic need of increased investment activity by either princi.144.. See the statement of Treasury Secretary Dillon in Hearngs,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 29, 54 (1963)
145. Beazer,, Expected Income Changes and the Lock-rn Effect of
the, Capital Gains Tax, 19 NAT'L TAX J. 303, 317-18 (1966), Holt & Shel±on, The Lock-rn Effect of the Capital Gains Tax, 15 NAT'L TAX J.337,
,352. (1962), Wallich, Taxation of Capital Gains rn the Light of Recent
Economic Developments, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 133, 135 (1965)
146. Hearings-pt. 1, at 369 (1963)
147. As Wallich recently put the matter, "The lock-rn effect of the

-capital gains tax has been enveloped in a great deal of controversy, but
of evidence there is not much." Wallich, supra note 145, at 145.
148. Holt & Shelton, supra note 145, at 343-49.
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pals or agents who are making investment decisions in contemplation of death, there is something wrong with the economy
that gains tax realization at death is unlikely to cure.
To be sure, the widespread interest in estate planning on
the part of middle-aged investors of some wealth is wholly sufficient evidence of compatibility between personal attention to
the prospect of one's death and investment activity. But such
planning is designed to guard against deaths that are statistically
premature. For such people, gains tax forgiveness appears as a
relatively remote future tax benefit.
In conclusion, it does appear that the lock-in effect of the
gains tax upon changes in investments by individuals contemplating death would tend to be reduced by switching from gains
tax forgiveness to realization at death. Since the prospect of
gains tax forgiveness is only immediate insofar as the prospect
of death is immediate, and since there is an obvious inverse relationship between one's personal vigor and one's prospects of
dying shortly, it seems far from clear that this tendency is of
substantial economic importance. Indeed, logically, it seems
probable that the lock-in effect has a greater impact upon investment decisions which are not materially influenced by the
prospect of gains tax forgiveness. 149

So much for the lock-in

argument. Its counterpart is that to realize the gains tax at
death will also produce undesirable economic effects.
B. THE LIQUIDITY PROBLEM
The problem here is that economic decisions may be distorted by the need to raise money for payment of the gains
tax on appreciated assets which, as an investment matter, should
not be sold.150 This may be true of both assets, such as many
listed securities, which are readily marketable and assets which
are hard to sell because their value is conjectural, or because
they have a limited market.
At least as to such investment assets as marketable securities, it is hard to be impressed with the point. We seem to think
it all right, economically, to compel would be purchasers of such
assets to purchase them out of income after taxes and hence dis149. If so, the whole problem may not be of substantial economic
importance. Heller, Investors' Decisions, Equity, and the Capital Gains
Tax, in JOINT CoVMITT.EE ON THE EcoNoimc REPORT, FEDERAL TAX POLICY
FOR EcoNomic GROWTH

AND STABILITY,

84TH CoNe., 1ST SESS. 381 (1955).

150. Wormser, The Case Against a Capital Gains Tax at Death, 51
A.B.A.J. 851 (1965).
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courage purchases. If so, why is it impermissible to impose a
gains tax upon newly deceased owners of such assets which have
appreciated because the tax might encourage sales-particularly
when we wait until the seller has died so that a change in ownership of the asset is necessary anyway? Further, enough has been
written about the separation of ownership and management of
publicly held corporate enterprises in recent years' 51 to suggest
that it is unlikely to be vital to the enterprise whether a decedent's beneficiaries or his estate's vendees succeed him as
stockholders.
There remain, of course, unmarketable assets that have appreciated, such as an interest in a small business. But the extent of the liquidity problem in respect of such interests can be
overstated.
If an arrangement has been made for the sale of such an
interest upon the death of its owner, there may be no liquidity
problem at all. Business purchase agreements, providing for the
sale of an interest in a corporation or partnership or the sale of a
proprietorship upon the owner's death are familiar estate plan152
ning tools.
If, on the other hand, the decedent wishes his beneficiaries
to retain his interest in a business, and if the value of the interest is modest enough so that the payment of taxes in respect
of it can be funded with insurance on the decedent's life, the
liquidity problem may be dealt with in this way. Under present
law, it may even be possible to work this out without exposing
the insurance proceeds themselves to the estate tax.153
151. E.g., A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY (19,59); J. LIVINGsToN,
THE AmERIcAN STOCKHOLDER (1958). Both of these recent books build,
of course, upon A. BERLE & G. MEANS, T E MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY

(1932).

152. See, e.g., 2 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLaNING, Ch. XV (3d ed. 1961).
153. Suppose that H is the controlling stockholder in H, Inc. His
wife, W, creates a revocable life insurance trust of policies insuring H's
life. W is the holder of all -incidents of ownership in the policies and
designates the trustee as beneficiary of the proceeds. W pays premiums
on the policies. The trust instrument authorizes the trustee to invest
the proceeds of the policies collected at H's death and provides that
stock in H, Inc. is a permissible investment. The beneficiaries of the
trust are W and the children of H and W. H dies, and the trustee, in
his discretion, purchases some or all of the H, Inc. stock at market value.
Since H had no incidents of ownership in the policies of insurance,
and did not pay any premiums within three years prior to his death, and
since H's executor had no power to require the trustee to purchase the
H, Inc. stock, it would appear that the proceeds of the policies would
escape inclusion in H's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes under

either INT.

REV. CODE

of 1954, § 2042 (as respects life insurance proceeds)
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Or, if the value of the interest is less modest, the need to
pay taxes in respect of it can sometimes be minimized by the
creation of a charitable foundation to receive a portion of the
decedent's interest. 15 4 Such a charitable gift may be deductible
for estate tax purposes 155 and apparently would not have been
subject to the Kennedy Administration's realization at death
proposal either.156
Also, under present law, stock redemptions are permitted in
order to meet the need for liquid funds to pay death taxes,1 57 and
there are provisions for installment payment of the estate tax in
respect of a small business interest. 58 The Kennedy Administration's realization at death proposal contemplated the extension
of these provisions to cover liability for gains taxes in respect of
gains realized at death.'- 9 Indeed, beyond this, that proposal
included averaging provisions to prevent the taxation of gains
60
realized at death at bunched-gain rates.
In view of these possibilities, it is certainly difficult to predict with confidence that the funding of gains tax liability at
death would pose a problem for the owners of small business
interests that would threaten the economic health of their enterprises. But, if further concessions are appropriate in this area,
does it not seem that death tax rate concessions, which would
benefit decedents whose business interests had not appreciated
since their acquisition as well as those whose interests had done
so, would be more appropriate than concessions in the area of
gains tax realization at death? After all, the bite of the estate
tax in respect of very valuable interests in closely held enterprises is considerably greater than that of the gains tax.
Also, it must be remembered that the present discussion concerns liquidity as a national economic problem. It is evident
that the problem can be much more serious for particular families who have not planned adequately to meet the problem than
for the economy as a whole.
or § 2035 (as respects gifts in contemplation of death). As to the chance
that, if H paid the premiums during the three years prior to his death,
a rateable portion of the insurance proceeds might be includible in his
estate under § 2035, see 1 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 328 (3d ed. 1961).
154. See, e.g., Leake, Use of Foundations in Estate Planning, N.Y.U.
16TH

INST. ON FED.

155. IwT. R Ev.

TAx. 929 (1958).
CoDE

of 1954, § 2055; Leake, supra note 154, 933 (1958).

156. Hearings,pt. 1, at 24, 54, 130, 139.
157. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 303.
158. IxT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6166.

159. Hearings,pt. 1, at 55, 137.
160. Id. at 137.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52: 1

As a recent study illustrates, one's own business associates
may squeeze him out of a small business, 161 or squeeze his
beneficiaries out following his death,'162 to the grave financial
disadvantage of the "squeezees' ' - 63 but not necessarily to the
disadvantage of the enterprise, which may emerge from the affair with a more competent management.6 4 To be sure, this
study emphasizes the economic injury to the particular small enterprises which experience such internal power struggles, as
well as the potential injury to the capital market for new highrisk enterprises if potential investors become overly wary of exposure to them.165 But the whole object of the study is to
examine means of minimizing squeeze-out problems by advance
166
planning.
Mutatis, it has been indicated above that the liquidity problem raised by gains tax realization at death can also be solved
by advance planning. If so, the problem will pose a difficulty
only to those who have failed to plan against it. The stake of
the economy in enterprises owned by the latter seems far from
clear.
This last point does not, of course, make a case for a realization at death proposal that is heedless of the liquidity problems
of those who have failed to plan adequately. 67 It does suggest,
however, that the strongest reasons for being attentive to such
problems may not lie in national economic aspects of the matter.
C.

REALIZATION

AT

DEATH AND THE SUPPLY OF PRIVATE CAPITAL

The immediate impact of gains tax realization at death
upon the formation of private capital, is, of course, that if it is
necessary to sell appreciated assets i. order to raise funds with
which to pay gains taxes, those who purchase the assets must
purchase them out of savings which would otherwise be available for investment in other productive assets. Hence, viewed
in isolation, realization at death has an unfavorable impact upon
the supply of savings for investment.1611
a 161. This may occur when the "squeezees" are overly trusting, less
able, inactive, superannuated, or in a minority position without safe-

guards.

See F. O'NEAL & J. DERWiN, ExPuLsIoN

AssocIATEs §§ 2.01-.03, 2.05, 2.15 (1961).
162. Id. § 2.04.
163. Id. §§ 1.04, 2.03-.04.

OR OPPRESSION Or BuSI-

NEss

164.

165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. § 2.06.

Id. § 1.05.
Id. § 1.06.
See text accompanying notes 121-23 supra.
There seems to be general agreement among economists that
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The weakness of the point is that, were the Congress to
conclude that the yield of this gains tax was a sufficient encroachment upon savings to merit some counterbalancing adjustment (a question which seems to be debatable at any point in
time),109 it would be easy enough to come up with counterbalancing adjustments which are easier to defend against the
charge of perpetuating regression in the income tax than is gains
tax forgiveness. 170 To mention three, the Kennedy Administration's realization at death proposal was included in an over-all
the gains tax is paid more largely out of funds that would otherwise be
reinvested than the income tax upon yields of personal services or invested capital. See, e.g., L. SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATmNT
OF

CAPiTAL GAiNs AND LosSES 87 (1951); D. SmITn,

FEDERAL

TAX REFOR

148-49 (1961); Wallich, supra note 145, at 142.
If a gains tax realized at death may be analogized to a death tax
rather than to a tax on gains realized inter vivos, the impact upon savings may be essentially the same. J. DuE, GoVERNmENT FiNANcE 369
(Rev. ed. 1959); D. Smi , supra; W. SHuLTZ & C. HAmuss, AmRincAN
PuBmLIc FiNANc 627 (6th ed. 1954).
169. This is so because of the intrinsic uncertainty as to whether the
long-term tendency of our economy is to produce a relative deficiency
of savings or of demand for capital. Kuznets states that our statistics
are necessarily confined to ex post facto measures of the supply of savings and the actual level of capital formation achieved which
cannot enable us to discriminate properly between two alternative hypotheses each of which refers to ex ante assumptions:
(1) that would-be savings were greater than would-be capital
investment opportunities (and that, therefore, the latter served
as a brake); or (2) that would-be savings were smaller than
would-be capital investment opportunities (and that, therefore,
the former served as a brake).
S. KuzNETs, CAPrrAL in T E AmEmucAN EcoNoMY 399 (1961). Hence
Kuznets' historical analysis of long-term trends in total capital formation and factors determining the volume of savings only leads him to a
"reasonable impression" that "the limitation on savings available for
financing capital formation held down capital formation levels..." over

the post-World War II period. Id.
170. Wallich's recent expression of concern with the impact of the
gains tax upon savings, WaiUich, supra note 145, at 143, has drawn fire
on the ground that off-setting adjustments are available. Folsom, Capital
Gains, Consumption, Capital Gains Taxes and the Supply of Saving, 19
NAT'L TAx J. 434, 436-37 (1966).
To illustrate the feasibility of such off-setting adjustments in the
present setting, the Treasury estimated that the revenue increase attributed to its gains tax-realization-at-death proposal would be around
$300,000,000 annually, and that an additional increase in revenue of
around $690,000,000 annually would result from increased voluntary
inter vivos sales of appreciated assets. Hearings, pt. 1, table 11, at 71.
The sum of these figures, then, $990,000,000 annually, would have been
the maximum estimate of the reduction in national savings stemming
from the adoption of this realization at death proposal. For an earlier
estimate of the yield of realization at death, see Steger, The Taxation of
Unrealized CapitalGains and Losses: A Statistical Study, 10 NAT'L TAX
J.266 (1957).
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package which included a proposal to reduce gains tax rates, 171
another to reduce the rates upon ordinary income which included
substantial reductions in the higher brackets, 7 2 and a third to
somewhat reduce corporate tax rates. 173 To mention another, the
American Law Institute is now discussing proposals for revision
of our estate and gift taxes, one of which includes rate changes
that apparently would produce substamtial short term reductions
in yield. 7 4 All of these are adjustments which tend to facilitate
saving and hence private capital formation, and all of them succeed in doing so without exempting gains from the income tax
altogether after the fashion of gains tax forgiveness.
D. FoRGIvENss VERsus RIAATIoIN
To Worn, SAVE, AN) IVEST

AT DEATH AND INCENTIVES

What seems of primary importance under this heading is
the incentives of the people in society who are capable of accumulating wealth while they are alive. And these are best
identified as those who have done so because their capacities are
demonstrated and, hence, are known quantities. 175 But the ef171. The Treasury estimated, in 196., that the composite effect of
the gains tax rate reduction and other minor adjustments would be a
revenue loss of $430,000,000 annually. Hearings, pt. 1, table 11, at 71.
172. The Treasury estimated, in 1963, that rate reductions applicable
to ordinary income for the 2% of taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes
of over $20,000 would, even when counterbalanced by other adjustments,
result in a net tax reduction for this class of taxpayers of $1,210,000,000
annually. Hearings,pt. 1, table 8, at 68. If we apply to this estimated
reduction Kuznets' tentative estimate of a 25% savings ratio for persons
whose incomes are in the top 5%, S. KUZNETS, supra note 169, at 100, the
increase in savings resulting from these reductions alone would be
around $300,000,000 annually.
173. The Treasury estimated, in 1963, that the revenue effect of its
proposed corporate tax rate reductions would be a reduction in yield of
$1,320,000,000 annually. If we apply Goode's estimate that 60-70% of
the yield of the corporate income tax reduces corporate income that
would otherwise have been saved by corporations or shareholders, R.
GOODE, THE CoRPoRATE IxcomE TAx 107-013 (1951), it is easy to conclude
that the increase in savings from this corporate rate reduction, together
with the gains tax rate reduction referred to in note 171 supra, would
more than off-set the reduction in savings resulting from adoption of
gains tax realization at death.
174. The rate schedule and exemption level proposed, at this stage
of the project, for a Unified Transfer Tax would reduce yield by an
estimated $855,000,000 annually. ALl FED. ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECT 6-9 (Study Draft No. 2, Nov., 1966).
The increment to savings resulting from such a reduction would appear to be comparable, dollar for
dollar, to the reduction resulting from adoption of gains tax realization
at death. See note 168 supra.
175. The percentage of American households containing one or more
members owning at least $60,000 of gross estate has recently been es-
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fect of a shift from gains tax forgiveness to gains tax realization
at death upon the incentives of these people to work, save, and
invest is a matter upon which both those who think family interests are of major importance, and those who think they are
not, ought to agree.
Those of the latter view will quickly note that to realize
the gains tax upon the event of a gratuitous transfer, inter vivos
or at death, is to levy a tax which will not burden the acquisition
16
of gain for purely personal purposes. 7
And those who think the former should hesitate to insist
that the desire to make gratuitous transfers of appreciated assets during one's life or at death may not be impeded by the
collection of a gains tax on the appreciation without econornically undesirable effects upon incentives to work, save, and invest, unless they are prepared, simultaneously, to insist that there
is an equal need to repeal the taxes upon ordinary income and
realized gains which impede not only accumulation of wealth but
the maintenance of dependents, inter vivos. This seems quite
enough of incentives.
E. Su~nvnaY
This brief look at the economics of gains tax forgiveness and
realization at death suggests that it does not matter much to
the national economy which choice is made.
Apparently, the lock-in effect of conditioning the gains tax,
inter vivos, upon a voluntary transfer would be somewhat reduced by realizing gains at death, though the national economic
significance of the change seems slight.
On the other hand, some troublesome individual liquidity
problems might be created by the adoption of realization at
death. But the composite possibilities of preplanning to assure
adequate liquidity, and of paying the tax in installments over a
period of years where preplanning has been inadequate, seem
likely to keep these problems within manageable bounds. After
all, these solutions to the liquidity problem are tested ones, under the federal estate tax. Moreover, it seems unlikely that
these individual problems would translate into appreciable problems for the economy as distinct from the individuals involved.
timated at a minimum of 2.28%. See note 85 supra. Of course, not all
of these people will have personally accumulated their wealth.
176.

H. SnoNs, PERSONAL INCOME TAxATIoN 20 (1938).
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Beyond this, the economic consequences of the choice seem
even less substantial. Thus, any possible untoward effects upon
saving and private capital formation seem readily amenable to
preferable counter-measures. And effects upon incentives to
work, save, and invest seem downright inconsequential.
III.

REALIZATION AT DEATH AS A PROBLEM IN
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING

The truly persuasive way to demonstrate that the drafting of
statutes to realize gains at death is a manageable task is to tender
a draft of appropriate statutes. But if, as is believed to be the
case, the following is a representative sample of the drafting
problems to be solved, it is hard to see why there should be
enervating doubts on this score.
First, many of the drafting problems which must be solved
in order to realize gains at death are not unfamiliar. Thus, the
problem of distinguishing assets subject to realization at death
from those that are not has its counterpart in the problem, under
present law, of identifying those assets which benefit from gains
tax forgiveness.
The solution to the corresponding problem in respect of
inter vivos gifts is less evident because, under present law, there
is a carry-over basis in respect of gifts and hence no change in
basis whether or not there is a completed gift for federal gift tax
purposes. If, as a general rule, we were to proceed in this area
by analogy to realization at death, realization in the event of a
gift would be tied to the making of a transfer that is taxable
under the federal gift tax. The Kennedy Administration's proposal seems to have proceeded on this premise, since some qualifications of it were proposed by the Treasury. 177 Alternatively,
gains could be realized to the donor to the extent that the inter
vivos transfer would render subsequent gains and losses taxable
to someone other than the donor for federal income tax purposes. 178 The basic case for this alternative would seem to be
177. A gift would not be treated as 'completed', and the gain
in the property involved subject to income tax, if the property
will be part of the gross estate for estate tax purposes. The
rules applicable to death transfers would be applied. (An exception would be made here for gifts in contemplation of death
which would be taxable as gift transfers, even though the property is part of the gross estate.)
Hearings,pt. 1, at 139.
178. Such an approach would, for instance, avoid realization of gain
upon the transfer of appreciated assets in a short-term trust, providing
for reversion of principal to the donor, which is effective to render the
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that realization of gain in the event of a gift ought to be governed
by the income tax conception of a gift, since the gains tax is an
1

income tax. 79
The problem of valuing assets which are to be subject to
realization at death has its counterpart, too, in valuing them for
the purpose of determining their basis under gains tax forgiveness, and for purposes of the federal estate tax. The problem
of valuing them for purposes of realization in the event of a gift
can be solved in the same way if realization in the event of a
gift is implemented by tying the definition of a taxable realization to the federal gift tax definition of a gift.
The problem of determining the decedent's basis for assets
which are to be subject to realization at death is largely a
problem in securing information which the decedent himself
should have recorded and retained for purposes of inter vivos income tax reporting. 80 And realization in the event of a gift
eliminates the need to retain basis information secured from
donors or to accept administrative fact-finding as at present.' 8 '
In the case of realization at death, the problem of avoiding
bunching of gains in the decedent's final return seems soluble
by adaptation of other provisions for the back-averaging of income. 18 2 And, if the application of realization at death produces a net loss in the decedent's final return, the problem of
utilizing the loss can be met by adding an appropriate carryback provision. 8 3 As prior discussion has indicated,8 4 the need
income beneficiary taxable on trust income, but under which the donor
remains taxable upon capital gains and losses realized by the trustee
during the trust term. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 673, 677 (a); Treas.
Reg. § 1.677 (a), (f),(g) (1956). It is possible that the Treasury contemplated a fractional realization of gain to the donor in such a case, since
it was proposed to realize a fraction of gains upon a transfer to the
donor's son for life with remainder to charity. Hearings,pt. 1, at 39.
179. Apparently this alternative is not presented in the case of realization at death, since the death of an individual seems to occur at
the same time for income and estate tax purposes.
180. There may be cases of individuals who have failed to retain
essential basis information with respect to nondepreciable assets because they fully intended to retain them until death to secure a new
basis. But it seems reasonable to put the burden of going forward upon
those who urge that many persons have been led to dispose of irretrievable evidence by such tax-conscious bookkeeping.
181. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1015-1(g), 1.1015-1 (a) (5) (1963).
182. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1301-05. These sections do not now
include capital gains in averagable income. Subsection 1302(a) (1), (b).
The Treasury proposed this approach in 1963, Hearings,pt. 1, at 137.
183. The Treasury proposed this approach in 1963. Hearings, 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 128-29.
184. See text accompanying notes 121-23 supra.
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to permit deferred payment of the gains tax realized at death to
relieve hardship caused by a shortage of cash or marketable
assets can be met by adaptation of provisions in the present law
designed to meet this problem under the federal estate tax.
At least one novel and substantial legislative problem is presented-that of devising a compulsory method of realizing gains,
periodically and in the absence of any transfer, in the case of
appreciated assets held in multigeneration trusts.18 5 But even
here it may be possible to proceed by analogy to an optional
method of inventory valuation under present law. 8 6 And it
seems likely that the problem will provoke more constitutional
debate 87 than drafting difficulty.
Second, assuming satisfaction with the case made above for
some special treatment of life insurance gains, there is no drafting difficulty in giving effect to an exception in this case. It is
only necessary to leave the present provisions governing the income taxation of life insurance proceeds undisturbed.
Third, other possible exceptions, which might be urged if the
initial scope of gains tax realization at death were to be as
broadly stated as the present rule of gains tax forgiveness, do not
present very frightening drafting problems either. In some cases
185. See text accompanying notes 5 & 142 supra.
186. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.471-5 (1958), securities dealers are permitted to value their inventories at market. The proposal would be to
periodically require a reporting of gains and losses on a market value
basis. Proposals for periodic compulsory realization of gains are, however, familiar in the literature of gains taxation. See, e.g., R. MusaAVE,
THE THEORY OF PUBLIc FiNANcE 167 (1959); H. SnwoNs, PERsoNAL INcomE

TAXATION 167 (1938).

187. This proposal for periodic realization in the case of multigeneration trusts would be a part of a general legislative scheme for gains
tax realization at death. As indicated early in this article, it is believed
that the general scheme is constitutionally permissible.
In view of the explicit invitation to the Congress in Helvering v.
Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 400-01 (1942), to enact a statute which would
permit the Supreme Court to reconsider the status of realization as a
constitutional requirement, Congress should not be reluctant to defend
periodic realization in the exceptional case of multigeneration trust as
a reasonable departure from the realization requirement to prevent
avoidance of realization at death by multigeneration transfers. See the
memoranda on the realization doctrine accompanying the Ways and
Means Committee's consideration of the 1962 Revenue Code amendments
taxing certain income of controlled foreign corporations to their United
States shareholders, note 76 supra.
But, assuming such congressional reluctance, there would seem to
be no constitutional obstacle to a periodic excise tax upon the privilege
of employing multigeneration trusts in an estate plan. See note 35 supra
and accompanying text.
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this is because familiar analogies are available. In others, the
propriety of, and hence need for, any exception is somewhat
dubious.
A likely instance of the first sort is that of defining the categories of personal belongings and household goods which were
to be left subject to forgiveness under the Kennedy Administration's realization at death proposal.1 88 This problem of definition is a familiar one to draftsmen of wills18 9 and probate codes.1 90
Another such instance may be that of an exception for appreciation in the value of a personal residence passing to the
surviving spouse of a decedent. Since we permit deferral of
recognized gains on the sale of a personal residence,' 9 ' the extension of a carry-over basis to a surviving spouse cannot be
objected to as inconsistent with the treatment of inter vivos
sales. Also, this exception can be supported as a further subsidy to adequate maintenance of people who may no longer be
productive. The drafting of such a provision would seem to pose
little difficulty since we have already faced the definitional aspects in connection with the nonrecognition provisions just referred to. The Kennedy Administration proposed to forgive the
gains tax in this case.' 9 2 It must be admitted, however, that such
an exception is hard to square with the income tax on maintenance level incomes.
The Kennedy Administration also proposed a forgiveness exception in the case of gifts to charity. 93 The preceding analysis
of gains tax forgiveness in terms of family interests is not dispositive of the question whether such an exception can be adequately supported on the merits. 194 Accordingly, the most that
can safely be said of this drafting problem is that if the exception should be made, the drafting problem seems soluble. The
188. Hearings,pt. 1, at 129-30.
189. Evidently, it is desirable to keep personal belongings and
household goods out of the residuary estate, which requires a bequest
of them and thus a workable definition.
190. E.g., MNN. STAT. § 525.15(1) (2) (1965), which provides for an
allowance out of the personal property of the decedent to his surviving
spouse, or minor children if no spouse survives.
191. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1034.
192. Hearings, pt. 1, at 133.
193. Hearings, pt. 1, at 130.
194. Perhaps it is unfriendly to the charitable exemption insofar as
the analysis invites attention to the question whether our interest in
subsidizing charity requires the selective incentive of an income tax
deduction for the value of untaxed income contributed to charity. But
we have not faced the question whether circumstances peculiar to the
social interest in charitable giving justify such a selective incentive.
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problem of discriminating between charitable and noncharitable
gifts is already a familiar one under the income tax law.195 And
the problem of allocating such an exemption where the charity
is bequeathed some interest in a fund of assets, such as a residuary estate, has been solved in other contexts under present
96

law.1

Nor is the preceding analysis dispositive of the merits of the
Kennedy Administration's proposed "marital exclusion," a carryover basis for assets transferred to a surviving spouse justified
surviving spouses in common
as a means of equating the status of 197
law and community property states.
If one takes as given the current statutory premise of the
community property states that spouses are cotenants of community assets, 98 the preceding analysis leads, easily enough, to
the conclusion that fidelity to gains tax realization at death requires deferral of the gains tax upon the surviving spouse's
share of appreciation in such assets until that spouse's death.
On the other hand, it seems difficult, under the preceding
analysis, to make a redistributional case for such a marital exclusion in common law states wherein the individually owned
assets of one spouse are transferred at death to the surviving
spouse. An affirmative redistributional case for the marital exclusion in such cases cannot be found in the reasoning used to
support a life insurance exception to realization at death, for
that exception ties to cases of premature death. Neither can
such a case be found in the reasoning used to support a carry-over
basis for a personal residence transferred to the surviving spouse,
for that exception ties to the nonrecognition of gain on sales of
residences, and to the need to maintain a surviving spouse.
And no support for such a case is offered by the fact that we
permit qualified retirement plans to be established which contemplate a spreading of retirement benefits over the expectancies of the employee and his spouse, 9 9 for such plans aim
primarily at providing maintenance in retirement.
195. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170 (c).
196. For example, § 642(c) permits an income tax deduction to decedent's estates and trusts for gross income destined for a charitable
beneficiary. For the corresponding federal estate tax treatment, see §
2055 and the Treasury's regulations thereunder.
197. Hearings,pt. 1, at 130.
198. 2 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY pt. 7, § 7.20 at 172 (Moynihan ed.
1952). This premise was originally accepted by the Supreme Court in
respect of the Washington statutes in Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
199. See text accompanying notes 109-10 supra.
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Thus the preceding analysis might be employed to oppose
the marital exclusion as applied to the transfer of individually
owned assets. The post-World War II decision to permit income-splitting between spouses could be reconciled with such opposition, for income-splitting is not a tax deferral device. And
our tradition of estate and gift tax marital deductions could
also be reconciled, for these relate to second (or later) taxes
on intrafamily transfers, not to the initial income tax thereon.
Accordingly, we are left with the question whether the
greater participation in ownership by a community property
spouse justifies a carry-over basis rule for community property
spouses that is not available to non-cotenant spouses in common
law states, or whether spouses in all jurisdictions should have
equal access to a carry-over basis. And, if the latter choice is
made, it must be decided whether we should have a "marital
exclusion" as proposed by the Kennedy Administration, or realization at death in respect of a surviving spouse's share of community property in community property states.
In view of these uncertainties on the merits of the marital
exclusion and on the merits of alternative solutions, it is difficult to know which set of drafting problems would have to be
dealt with. But, if the marital exclusion is deemed desirable,
we have the composite experience gleaned from the numerous
carry-over basis and basis allocation provisions of existing law,
and the marital deduction provisions of the estate and gift tax
law, to lean on in drafting the provision.
Other possible exceptions to realization at death which seem
likely to provoke debate include those regarding items of income
in respect of a decedent, 20 0 and depreciable property subject to
depreciation recapture.20 '
As to the former, the Kennedy Administration proposed an
exception for those items of income in respect of a decedent
which yield ordinary income to the decedent's successor. Gain
was to have been determined in respect of such items with reference to the decedent's basis, as is the case under present law.
It was proposed that items of inventory belonging to a deceased
proprietor be included within the same category 02 The draft200. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 691. The Kennedy Administration's
proposal in this area is presented in Hearings,pt. 1, at 137-38.
201. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1245, 1250. The Kennedy Administration's proposals regarding depreciation recapture are presented in
Hearings, pt. 1, at 138.
202. Hearings, pt. 1, at 138.
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ing problems here seem manageab].e, and, because the typical
period of deferral of ordinary income taxes in such cases would
probably be short, the proposed treatment seems defensible. The
omission of a corresponding proposal to grant a carry-over basis
in the case of inter vivos gifts of inventory may be supported as
necessary to prevent the assignment of inventory gains to lower
203
bracket donees.
It was also proposed, however, that gain be realized at death
in the case of items of income in respect of a decedent yielding
capital gain,20 4 such as gain on a deferred payment sale of
land. This proposal would prevent tax-conscious owners of appreciated assets from making deferred payment sales in contemplation of death in order to avoid immediate realization of
gain at death. However, it may be argued that, in cases of premature death, such realization conflicts unnecessarily with the
objectives of the installment sales provisions. 20 5 Perhaps gains
could be realized at death if the buyer's period of performance
substantially exceeds the actuarial expectancy of persons of the
decedent's age at his death, the balance of such cases being left
within the category of items of income in respect of a decedent.
The Kennedy Administration also proposed realization at
death in the case of depreciable property subject to depreciation
recapture. 20 6 In the case of depreciable property which is not
so subject, realization at death may be less burdensome than in
the case of capital assets. The reason is that the decedent's successors may be able to recoup any basis increase resulting from
gains tax realization at death in the form of additional depreciation deductions against their ordinary income.
On the other hand, depreciation recapture means realization of ordinary gain. The burden here is clearly greater than
in the case of realization of capital gains at death. Moreover, as
to relatively short-lived assets, a carry-over basis would only result in a deferral of taxes attributable to excessive depreciation
for a correspondingly short period of time, even if the assets
were retained by the decedent's successors throughout their
20 7
useful lives.
203. The Treasury sought, unsuccessfully, to prevent such assignments years ago. See note 37 supra and-accompanying text.
204. Hearings, pt. 1, at 138.
205. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453.
206. Hearings,pt. 1, at 138.
207. In the case of relatively short-:lived assets, excessive depreciation deductions in the earlier years of use will shortly become inadequate depreciation deductions in the later years of use. Hence, if the
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Accordingly, one is somewhat tempted toward realization at
death for appreciated depreciable property in respect of which
the capital gain element in the appreciation is likely to be dominant (e.g., section 1250 assets?), while being tempted toward a
carry-over basis for appreciated depreciable property in respect
of which the ordinary gain element is likely to be dominant
(e.g., section 1245 assets?).
However, whatever the decisions on the merits in this area,
the drafting problems seem manageable. To the extent that
realization at death is to apply to assets subject to depreciation
recapture, this result will follow from failure to create an exception to cover them. Or, if a carry-over basis is to be permitted
in some cases, we know how to draft statutes which provide
for this basis result.
Finally, something should be said of the Kennedy Administration's proposed blanket forgiveness of $15,000 in gains "to
permanently exempt relatively small estates from the impact of
the proposal." 208 Why? We do not exempt, as "relatively small,"
items of income in respect of a decedent of this order of magnitude, such as wages, even though it is arguable that the presence
of personal service income in respect of a decedent is indicative of a premature death.20 9 If the proposal had been confined
to such an amount of appreciation in defined categories of relatively unmarketable assets, it might be defended as a matter of
administrative convenience-at least if confined by an appropriate limitation in terms of the size of the decedent's adjusted
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. But what is difficult
about determining the first $15,000 of appreciation in a small
portfolio of marketable securities? However, if such a blanket
exemption is desired, the drafting problem presented does not
other dollar-value basis
seem to differ from that of allocating
210
adjustments among a variety of assets.

decedents successor has sufficient taxable income, the decedent's prac-

tice of excessive depreciation will shortly result in higher income taxes
for his successor. There would remain, of course, the possibility of net
tax savings to the family if the decedent's personal rates were higher
than those of his successors. But the possibility of such tax savings may
be greater in the case of a decedent who dies during his .productive life
than in the case of one who dies at the close of it.
208. Hearings, pt. 1, at 129.
209. Prematurity of death, it will be recalled, was the basis upon
which a continuation of income tax forgiveness in the case of pure life
insurance proceeds was justified. See text accompanying notes 126-34

supra.

210. E.g., INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 734, 743, 1017.
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This sampling of the drafting problems which must be faced
in order to implement gains tax realization at death has largely
been focused upon the collection of the gains tax at death rather
than upon the event of an inter vivos gift. However, it is believed that this emphasis has not materially impaired the representative character of the sample. To conclude, then, on this final aspect of the matter, it is difficult to regard the drafting
problems just surveyed as a serious obstacle to the adoption of
gains tax realization at death, given satisfaction with the appropriateness of such realization on the merits.
IV. CONCLUSION
This case for realizing gains at death can be summarized in
few words.
First, the question of whether or not gains should be so
realized appears to be one of legislative policy, little affected by
the compulsions of Constitutional law.
Second, it has been urged that the question of whether or
not they should be so realized should be determined primarily on
the basis of the impact of such realization upon family interests
in the inheritance of property. This focus has been thought specifically appropriate because that family interest is the primary
beneficiary of gains tax forgiveness, and hence would bear the
primary impact of a switch to gains tax realization at death.
And this focus has been thought more generally appropriate, too,
because the family interest in the inheritance of property is an
interest in redistribution within the family, and, as such, a part
of the family tradition of redistribution for the benefit of famfly members which is, perhaps, our society's most universally
persuasive precedent for redistribution across society through
progressive taxation.
Third, it appears, upon a comparative examination of gains

tax forgiveness and realization at death from this point of view,
that the former is indefensible because we do not customarily
exempt income from taxation in deference to family redistribu-

tional interests, and because the adoption of the latter places
only a restrained income tax burden upon the family interest
in inheriting appreciated assets. Indeed, it was found to be quite

enough of a task to distinguish the forgiveness of the income
tax in the case of the proceeds of pure life insurance, by heavy
emphasis upon the relevance of the prematurity of death which

characterizes such life insurance gains, without attempting to sup-
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port a final forgiveness of a gains tax already deferred. By
contrast, it was found relatively easy to distinguish the exclusion of gratuitous receipts from income, and even relatively
easy to distinguish the collection of gift or death taxes only once
in several generations, since these involve second, or later, taxes
upon the accumulation and transmission of family wealth, rather
than the initial income tax thereon.
Fourth, it appears that the consequences to the nation's
economy of retaining gains tax forgiveness, or switching to
realization at death, are of insufficient importance to require
a substantial modification of the preceding analysis in terms of
family interests.
Fifth, it does not appear that the drafting difficulties which
must be faced in implementing a switch to gains tax realization
at death are of sufficient importance to require such modification.
Renewed attention to the Kennedy Administration's proposals of 1963 in light of the foregoing is, therefore, respectfully
urged upon the Treasury and the Congress.

